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INTRODUCTION 
In China, community corrections programs were introduced as a 
pilot program in 2003, implemented nationwide in 2009, and included in 
the Criminal Law1 in 2011. However, the Criminal Law2 does not clearly 
define community corrections and what these programs entail. The 
Announcements issued by the Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”), the 
Supreme People’s Procuratorate (“SPP”), the Ministry of Public Security 
(“MPS”), and the Ministry of Justice (“MJ”) in 2003 provide the only 
official definition of community corrections and community corrections 
programs. In China, community corrections are defined as public 
surveillance (“PS”), suspended sentence, parole, temporary service of 
sentence outside prison, and deprivation of political rights 3  under the 
                                                
1 The Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China is a codified compilation 
of China’s criminal statutes. 
2  Government documents in China do not make a clear distinction between 
community corrections and community corrections programs. They are all expressed in 
‘she qu jiao zheng, 社区矫正.’ In this article, community corrections and community 
corrections programs are distinguished according to the contexts of government 
documents. Community corrections denote the punishments that serve as an alternative to 
imprisonment by managing and supervising offenders in the community itself instead of 
in prison; while community corrections programs refer to correctional programs attached 
to existing community corrections.  
3 With Amendment VIII in 2011, deprivation of political rights was excluded 
from community corrections programs. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa (中华人民
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Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law.4 This definition further 
explains that community corrections programs refer to measures that are 
the opposite of custodial dispositions. 5  During determined sentencing 
periods, criminals under community corrections programs receive 
assistance to address their respective mental and behavioral problems, and 
are reintegrated into society by specialized state organs with the assistance 
of non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) and volunteers. Thus, 
community corrections programs are designed to attach supplementary 
rectification and educational approaches to existing community 
corrections. 
From the outset of the implementation of community corrections 
programs, there has been an ongoing debate about whether the attached 
rectification and educational approaches will turn into new forms of 
informal punishments. 6  The term, informal punishments, may have 
different meanings for different scholars. The features of informal 
punishments identified here are similar to those used by S. Jiang and 
Lambert:7 their grounds are morality or policy rather than law, and they 
are operated by unofficial controlling individuals and groups. 
Traditionally, formal and informal punishments coexist in China. 
Historically, Chinese leadership relied heavily on informal means to 
maintain social order and settle disputes, and established a minimalist law 
enforcement authority. The Chinese law enforcement authority was only 
responsible for serious crimes and settling conflicts beyond the scope of 
informal mechanisms.8 In China, the tendency towards harsh punishment 
is known as heavy penaltyism (zhong xing zhu yi, 重刑主义), and under 
heavy penaltyism, punishments at the low end of punishment spectrum are 
                                                                                                                     
共和国刑法) [PRC Criminal Law] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 
1979, effective as amended Feb. 25, 2011) (China).  
4 Guan Yu Kai Zhan She Qu Jiao Zheng Shi Dian Gong Zuo De Tong Zhi (关于
开展社区矫正试点工作的通知) [Announcement on the Development of Pilot Locations 
for Community Corrections] art. 2 (issued by the SPC, SPP, MPC, and MJ, 2003) 
(China). 
5 The custodial dispositions in China are imprisonment and criminal detention 
(ju yi, 拘役). 
6 Liu Renwen (刘仁文), Hou Lao Jiao Shi Dai De Fa Zhi Zai Chu Fa (后劳教
时代的法治再出发) [Several Issues in Promoting Rule of Law After the Abolition of 
RTL], 23 J. NAT’L PROSECUTORS C. 146, 147-49 (2015); Robert Williams, “Community 
Corrections” and the Road Ahead for Re-Education through Labor, CHINA FILE (2014), 
https://www.chinafile.com/community-corrections-and-road-ahead-re-education-through-
labor. 
7 Shanhe Jiang & Eric G. Lambert, Views of Formal and Informal Crime Control 
and Their Correlates in China, 19 INT’L CRIM. JUST. REV. 5, 7 (2009). 
8 Wei Wu & Tom Vander Beken, The Evolution of Criminal Interrogation Rules 
in China, 40 INT’L J. L. CRIME & JUST. 271, 271-95 (2012). 
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rarely enforced. S. Jiang and Lambert’s study shows that, in terms of 
effectively controlling crime, most Chinese had a slightly more favorable 
view toward informal measures, as opposed to formal measures.  
In 2013, the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”) abolished the most 
notorious informal punishment, re-education through labor (“RTL” lao 
dong jiao yang, 劳动教养), 9  and promoted community corrections 
programs simultaneously.10 To date, beyond an official proclamation, the 
government has made no authoritative claims as to what the transition will 
look like for RTL. 11  Evidently, the concurrent abolition of RTL and 
implementation of community corrections programs has led many 
observers to postulate that the community corrections programs were new 
informal punishments in and of itself.12 Otherwise, new forms of informal 
punishments may be created in the near future. 
Party officials nevertheless said that the community corrections 
programs were not meant as replacements for RTL. At a press conference, 
the Vice Minister of Justice, Zhao Decheng, said that China’s community 
corrections programs would not evolve into a new form of RTL, and the 
community corrections programs were designed to educate convicts. As 
such, a convicted person would not be held in a detention center, but 
instead would be required to receive rectification education in the 
community in which s/he lived.13 Moreover, Jiang Aidong, the director of 
the Community Corrections Administration Bureau of the MJ, claimed 
                                                
9 RTL was imposed on persons whose wrongdoings were so minor that it did not 
constitute a criminal offence. The wrongdoers under RTL were detained and forced to 
work for one to three years, with a one year extension whenever necessary. Police 
departments issues regulations regarding RTL. After the police investigated, they judged 
and enforced RTL cases. There had been debate on whether RTL was an administrative 
punishment, an administrative coercive measure, or an informal punishment. The 
Administrative Punishment Law was issued in 1996 and the Administrative Coercion 
Law was promulgated in 2011. Nonetheless, RTL was neither on the lists of 
administrative punishments nor on the lists of administrative coercive measures. In fact, 
RTL violated the Legislative Law and the Constitution. Article 8 of the Legislative Law 
prescribes that mandatory measures and penalties involving restrictions on the freedom of 
persons shall only be governed by law. Article 37 of the Constitution prohibits unlawful 
detention or deprivation or restriction of citizens’ freedom. RTL did not have a solid legal 
basis as the NPC never promulgated any specific laws concerning RTL. Therefore, this 
article considers RTL as an informal punishment. 
10 Guan Yu Quan Mian Shen Hua Gai Ge Ruo Gan Zhong Da Wen Ti De Jue 
Ding (关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定) [Resolution Concerning Some Major 
Issues in Comprehensively Deepening Reform], (issued by the Central Committee of the 
CCP on 15 November 2013) (China).  
11 Liu Renwen, supra note 6; Williams, supra note 6. 
12 Liu Renwen, supra note 6; Williams, supra note 6.  
13 Yan Shaohua & Yang Xiuchan, Dui Guan Zhi Xing De Li Shi Kao Cha Yu Zai 
Ren Shi, 116 THEORY J. 34 (2003). 
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that community corrections and RTL were two distinct legal systems 
differing in nature. Community corrections would only be applied to 
adjudged criminals rather than administrative offenders.14 
This article examines the actual nature of community corrections 
programs. Are they a new type of informal punishment, or are they simply 
rehabilitation and social service programs attached to existing community 
corrections? From a penological point of view, retracing the roots of 
China’s penal system helps to clarify the CCP’s criminal policy choices 
and the complexity, and perhaps even the prospects, of community 
penalties in contemporary China. Part One of this article explores the roots 
of China’s penal system, and includes an examination of the coexistence 
of informal and formal punishments, as well as the heavy penaltyism of 
formal punishments in China. Part Two of this article explores the 
development of community corrections programs in contemporary China. 
Since 2003, China has strived to formalize and professionalize 
traditional, informal, and semiformal community-based corrections. 15 
However, in terms of the system design and current practice, local officers 
are likely to deviate from the program’s good intentions. While the CCP 
insisted that reform and assistance should be the main focus of community 
corrections programs, there are several barriers obstructing their proper 
implementation. In practice, the reform and assistance functions are 
frequently subordinated to supervision functions. Additionally, the local 
bureaus of justice make significant efforts to recruit assistants to 
community corrections officers and workers in grassroots organizations, to 
serve as social workers and volunteers in order to reinforce routine 
supervision practices pursuant to the local regulations on community 
corrections, albeit without legal authorization. The general public seems to 
play a more effective role in supervision rather than in correction and 
assistance. Therefore, in many ways, community corrections programs 
show signs of informal punishments. 
I. THE COEXISTENCE OF INFORMAL AND FORMAL PUNISHMENTS IN 
HISTORY 
Through China’s history, informal and formal punishments have 
coexisted, with a strong emphasis on the former. If someone committed a 
minor offense, s/he was more likely to receive an informal punishment 
rather than a formal one. In traditional China, the informal punishments 
were mainly clan (zong zu, 宗族) punishments; in socialist China, the 
most widely applied informal punishment was RTL.  
                                                
14 Q. Cui & W. Yang, Exclusive interview for Jiang Aidong, the director of 
Community Correction Administration Bureau of the Ministry of Justice, GOV.CN (2014), 
http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2014-01/05/content_2560187.htm. 
15  Shanhe Jiang et al., Community Corrections in China: Development and 
Challenges, 94 THE PRISON J. 75 (2014).  
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The regular application of severe and excessive informal 
punishments means that criminal punishments at the low end of the 
punishment spectrum were rarely applied. The formal justice system 
constitutes a key element of the social control system, but was more of a 
last resort.16 In practice, formal punishments were mainly responsible for 
punishing serious offenses, and authorities were more inclined to impose 
the harshest allowable penalties. 17  Therefore, heavy penaltyism is 
prevalent throughout Chinese history. 
 
A. Clan Punishments and the Five Punishments (wu xing, 五刑) in 
Traditional China 
1. Confucianization of Law 
One of the distinct characteristics of Chinese imperial culture was 
its astonishing consistency throughout its two-thousand-year history. From 
the beginning of the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.E.-220 C.E.) to the late Qing 
Dynasty (1644-1911), China possessed a highly developed and 
sophisticated system of penal law, and the legal provisions survived 
centuries of development without much change. 18  Accordingly, the 
philosophies upon which the penal laws were based essentially did not 
change for two thousand years.19 
Although somewhat legalist in spirit, western academics have 
described the penal law of imperial China as legalist in form and 
predominantly Confucian in spirit. 20  On the other hand, most Chinese 
scholars describe it as “Legalism with a Confucian façade.” 21 
Confucianism and legalism, the two established schools of thought in East 
Zhou Dynasty (1046 B.C.E.-771 B.C.E.), exerted a major influence on 
penal philosophy in imperial China. As two competing schools of thought, 
there was an endless tug of war regarding how best to punish offenders. 
                                                
16 Xiaoming Chen, Social and Legal Control in China: A Comparative 
Perspective, 48 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 523 n.13 (2004). 
17 Before Deng’s legal reform, punishments were often harsher than the most 
severe statutory sentences. 
18 Zhang Jing (张荆), Beijing She Qu Jiao Zheng Mo Shi Te Se Yu Wen Ti Dian 
Fen Xi (北京社区矫正模式特色与问题点分析) [Assessment on the Characteristics and 
Problems of Community Correction in Beijing], 163 J. PEOPLE’S PUB. SECURITY U. 
CHINA (Social Sciences Edition) 45 (2013). 
19 Id. 
20 Geoffrey MacCormack, The Spirit of Traditional Chinese Law 1-2 (U. of Ga. 
Press 1996). 
21 Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, How China Was Ruled, The American Interest Mar/Apr 
2008. (2008); Demei Zhang, Jia Zuo Ben Wei Shi Jiao Xia De Fa Lu Ru Jia Hua, 76 J. 
COMP. L. 29 (2011).  
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Confucianists advocated that rulers should exercise prudence and 
restraint before punishing criminals. According to Confucianists, 
“[w]henever the net of legal entanglements could be bypassed, or 
whenever jurisdictional control could be avoided, or whenever there was 
no question of intimation, the individual would still be evil since he had 
undergone no change of heart.” 22  Punishment would only temporarily 
deter people from committing crimes.23  
To prevent criminal activity, Confucianists placed great value on 
moral education. Education would enable a person to be consciously 
aware of shame and not suffer from evil intentions.24 To Confucianists, 
proper education was the most thorough, fundamental, and successful way 
to attain their social aims, including crime control.25 The codes of ethics 
and canons of proper behaviors were known as “rites” (li, 礼),26 and these 
rites were “the rules of propriety, that furnish the means of determining the 
relatives, as near and remote; of settling points which may cause suspicion 
or doubt; of distinguishing where there should be agreement, and where 
difference; and of making clear what is right and what is wrong.” 27 
“Punishments prevent what has already happened” while “rites prevent 
what is going to happen.”28 Faith in their ruler was based on their faith in 
the rite system (li yuezhi, 礼制). For those who broke the rules of rites, 
Confucianists believed that it was possible to reform them through the 
influence of moral education. “The fleabane growing in the field of hemp 
becomes straight itself without support.” 29  Consequently, the moral 
influence of rites would function as a more effective deterrent than 
punishment. 
As a last resort, Confucius accepted that there might be 
extraordinary circumstances in which a ruler had to punish irredeemable 
wrongdoers. However, even in such extraordinary circumstances, 
Confucius stressed that the ruler must exercise great moral restraint before 
                                                
22 TONGZU QU, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA § 4 (Mouton 1947). 
23 CONFUCIUS, LUN YU, IN THE COLLECTION OF CHINESE CLASSICS 6 (Bojun 
Yang ed. 1980) (1996). 
24 Id. 
25 QU, supra note 22. 
26 CONFUCIUS, LUN YU, IN THE COLLECTION OF CHINESE CLASSICS 6 (Bojun 
Yang ed. 1980) (1996). 
27  WANG WENJIN (王文锦), LI JI YI JIE (礼记译解) 13 (Zhonghua Book 
Company 2001). 
28  BAN GU (班固), HAN SHU (汉书) 74 (Shigu Yan Ed., Zhonghua Book 
Company 1962). 
29 ZHOU SHANG, XUN ZI (YUAN GU ZHEN YAN) 25 (China Worker Press. 2002). 
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penalizing offenders. 30  The imposition of capital punishment before 
informing the public was considered cruel.31 Furthermore, Confucianists 
believed in the malleability of human beings. 32 Confucius said, “not to 
mend the fault one has made is to err indeed.”33 As such, wrongdoers 
should have the opportunity to correct their mistakes.  
According to Confucius, punishments should pertain to rites, and 
the severity of punishment should be proportional to the seriousness of the 
crime: “When rites do not flourish, punishments will not be exactly right; 
when punishments do not be exactly right, the populace will be puzzled 
about how to behave acceptably.” 34  The notion of the “exactly right” 
punishment refers to the principle of proportionality and penal parsimony. 
Indeed, Confucius articulated that if punishments were lenient, the 
punishment would not deter the general populace from committing crimes. 
The ruler would then need to over-correct by imposing severe penalties. 
On the other hand, if the ruler imposed severe punishments, the rule would 
oppress his subjects, and the ruler would need to implement lenient 
punishments. Therefore, the ideal result was the balance and 
proportionality of crime and punishment.35 
Over time, in opposition to Confucius’ original teachings, 
Confucianists believed that punishment played a more significant role in 
deterring crime. Mencius and Xunzi, two of the most renowned 
Confucianists in history, believed that punishment should play a lesser role 
than moral education, but, unlike Confucius, they regarded punishment as 
an effective tool to deter crime.36 Without punishment, they argued, there 
would be injustice. For example, Mencius said, “[v]irtue alone is not 
sufficient for the exercise of government; laws alone cannot carry 
themselves into practice.”37 Likewise, Xunzi said, “If people are punished 
without education, penalties will be enormous and evil cannot be 
overcome; if they are educated without punishment, evil people will not be 
punished.”38  
                                                
30 CONFUCIUS, LUN YU, IN THE COLLECTION OF CHINESE CLASSICS 42 (Bojun 
Yang ed. 1980). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 ZUO QIUMING (左丘明), ZUO ZHUAN ZHENG ZONG (左传正宗) § 6 (Suo Li 
ed., Huaxia Publishing House 2011). 
36 QU, supra note 22. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
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The Confucians emphasized moral education over punishment to 
deter crime but contrarily, the legalists denounced moral education as an 
effective crime deterrent. The legalists argued that moral education was 
the work of moralists.39 Moralists may persuade some people to abstain 
from committing crime, but moralism would fail to prevent control crime 
within the general populace.40 In their view, many people were evil by 
nature, and moral education alone could not reform these people.41 
Accordingly, legalists were concerned with people’s potential for 
evil.42 Legalists viewed punishment as the most effective and efficient way 
to prevent crime. 43  To objectively determine the proper penalty for a 
crime, legalists advocated for enacting a uniform law.44 The function of 
law was to punish criminals and deter potential criminals, and not to 
encourage doing good.45 “For good man who committed no crime and the 
bad man who feared punishment so much that he dared commit no crime, 
their overt behavior was the same, and there was no need to concern 
oneself with what was in the heart.”46  
Legalism emphasized the deterrent effect of punishment. Legalists 
objected to pardons and argued that if minor offenses were pardoned, 
crime would flourish.47 Indeed, if the smallest offense received the most 
severe punishment, then, in the end, people would cease to commit crime, 
and punishment therefore would become unnecessary.48 In the Hanfeizi 
(韩非子), the legalist scholar Han Fei states: 
 
Now all of those who do not know how to rule said that 
heavy punishments were harmful to the populace, and 
should light punishments be able to prevent evil, there 
would be no need to use heavy ones. Such discourse is the 
result of not knowing how to govern. That which is to be 
prevented by severe punishment is not always prevented by 
                                                
39 HAN FEI & CHEN QIYOU (韓非 & 陳奇猷), HAN FEI ZI JI SHI (韓非子集釋) 51 
(Shijie Book Company 1972). 
40 QU, supra note 22. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 GUAN ZHONG & LI XIANGFENG (管仲 & 黎翔鳳), GUAN ZI JIAO ZHU (管子校
注) 228 (Zhonghua Book Company 2004). 
48 GEOFFREY MACCORMACK, THE SPIRIT OF TRADITIONAL CHINESE LAW 2-3 (U. 
of Ga Press 1996). 
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light ones, but that which is to be prevented by light 
punishment must also be prevented by heavy ones. 
Therefore, when heavy punishment is applied, all crime 
will be prevented, and as all crimes are prevented, why will 
it be harmful to the populace.49  
 
Legalists referred to this process as abolishing punishments with 
punishments.50 
 Legalists are credited with creating the legal system that 
ultimately led to the Qin Dynasty’s dominance. Qin established the first 
unified empire in China in 221 B.C.E. The empire, however, survived for 
only five years, the briefest dynasty in Chinese history. The politicians and 
scholars of the ensuing Han dynasty attributed the fall of the Qin Empire 
to both the despotism of legalism and the deviation from Confucian 
virtue. 51  Han Emperor Wu, who ruled China from 140 B.C.E. to 87 
B.C.E., established Confucianism as the official ideology of the state.52 
The political leaders of the Han Dynasty and successive dynasties 
recognized the practical need for an expansive penal code. These leaders 
learned from the Qin Dynasty’s unification of China that a centralized 
empire requires a uniform penal system to exercise control over its 
subjects.53 
Laws and rites were coextensive, as were penal codes and clan 
codes. The codes in imperial China were the embodiment of the ethical 
norms of Confucianism.54 To reinforce Confucian morality, the penal law 
punished behavior that violated the rites. 
2. Clan Punishment System 
The ethical norms in Imperial China were roughly divided into 
four levels, of which were rites (li, 礼), righteousness (yi, 义), honesty 
(lian, 廉) and shame (chi, 耻).55 Rites and shame were the highest and 
lowest ethical norms respectively. The rites system was duty-oriented. The 
                                                
49 HAN FEI & CHEN QIYOU, supra note 39, at 43. 
50  DENG JIANPENG (邓建鹏), ZHONG GUO FA ZHI SHI (中国法制史) 85-91 
(Peking U. Press 2011); GUOHUA SUN, § JURISPRUDENCE (China’s Procuratorate Press 
1997).  
51 QU, supra note 22. 
52 CAO DEBEN (曹德本), ZHONG GUO ZHENG ZHI SI XIANG SHI (中国政治思想
史) 309-312 (Senior Educ. Press. 2012); LECHEN FU, THE HISTORY OF CHINA 41-44 
(China Publisher Company 1972). 
53 LECHEN FU, THE HISTORY OF CHINA 65-72 (China Publisher Company 1972). 
54 QU, supra note 22. 
55  SIMA GUANG (司馬光), ZI ZHI TONG JIAN (資治通鑑) 276-277 (Cent. 
Compilation and Translation Press 2011). 
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Confucians held that “filial piety is the basic rite.”56 The primary value 
orientation of an individual was filial piety to one’s parents, responsibility 
to one’s family and the loyalty to one’s ruler.57 “Few of those who are 
filial and fraternal will show disrespect to their rulers.”58 As kinship is a 
priority in the rite system, Confucians also advocated that the ruler should 
not infringe on clan affairs. A good, Confucian family would supervise the 
behavior of its own members and punish errant behavior accordingly.59 A 
family should enforce punishment privately rather than publicly. 
Accordingly, moral remediation was the family’s collective duty.60 Since 
the Han Dynasty, emperors recognized that the Confucian emphasis on 
family and communal solidarity benefited society as a whole.61 Conflict 
resolution within the family and within the community in an amicable way 
would build deeper community ties and reduce magistrate caseload. Clan 
leaders were entrusted with the authority to self-regulate its members.62  
Accordingly, those who committed minor offenses were often 
punished by clan leaders pursuant to their respective clan code rather than 
by magistrate under the criminal code. 63  Thus, the clan, which is the 
exogamous patrilineal group of males descended from founding ancestors, 
could adopt rules for the personal conduct of its members.64 Clan leaders 
were not elected, but rather inherited their positions. 65  In every clan, 
several men of integrity and ability were selected by the clan leaders as 
judges.66 The clan leaders tended to send their clan codes to magistrates 
for approval. 67  Magistrates administered all aspects of government on 
                                                
56 ZUO QIUMING, supra note 35. 
57 CONFUCIUS, LUN YU, in THE COLLECTION OF CHINESE CLASSICS 43 (Bojun 
Yang ed. 1980) (1996). 
58 Id. 
59 QU, supra note 22. 
60 KLAUS MUHLHAHN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CHINA: A HISTORY 16 (Harvard U. 
Press. 2009; JINFAN ZHANG, THE TRADITION AND MODERN TRANSITION OF CHINESE LAW 
229 (Springer 2013).  
61 MUHLHAHN, supra note 60; ZHANG, supra note 60. 
62 MUHLHAHN, supra note 60; ZHANG, supra note 60. 
63 MUHLHAHN, supra note 60; ZHANG, supra note 60. 
64 MUHLHAHN, supra note 60; ZHANG, supra note 60. 
65 MUHLHAHN, supra note 60; ZHANG, supra note 60.  
66 Gao Qicai & Luo Chang (高其才 & 罗 昶), Zhong Guo Gu Dai She Hui Zong 
Zu Shen Pan Zhi Du Chu Tan (中国古代社会宗族审判制度初探), 45 J. HUAZHONG 
NORMAL U. HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. 98-101 (2006); Zheng Ding & Ma Jianxing (郑定 & 马
建兴), Lun Zong Zu Zhi Du Yu Zhong Guo Chuan Tong Fa Lu Wen Hua (论宗族制度与
中国传统法律文化), 32 JURIST 12-19 (2002). 
67 Gao Qicai & Luo Chang (高其才 & 罗 昶), Zhong Guo Gu Dai She Hui Zong 
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behalf of the emperor, including holding a court. Although it was not an 
obligation, magistrates encouraged the clan leaders to do so.68 
If a clan member committed a minor offense, the clan would 
convene in their ancestral hall and deliberate as to the proper recourse.69 
To be summoned to appear before the entire clan and its leaders was a 
humiliation in itself.70 Examples of penalties for minor offenses include: 
recording the offense, payment of fines, denial of income for a period of 
time, a slap in the face, and standing or kneeling in a corner during the 
clan’s meeting. 71  One of the most severe and effective forms of 
punishment was expulsion from the clan. The convicted person was shut 
out from the community consisting of all members of the clan, either 
living or dead.72 
3. Five Punishments 
Ancient societies used tort law, rather than criminal law. 73 In 
ancient China, the Five Punishments were the symbolic system of 
punishments under criminal law. 74 However, the content of the Five 
Punishments was frequently changed by rulers.75  Pre-sixteenth century 
B.C.E., the primitive Han tribes, the dominant nationality in China, 
exercised two forms of punishments: stick-beating and exile. 76  Stick-
beating was utilized as a means to educate criminals, while exile meant the 
expulsion of criminals from the tribe.77 Later, the Five Punishments from 
the Miao, a minority nationality in China, were introduced. The specific 
punishments included tattooing, cutting off a person’s nose, severing a 
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person’s feet, castration, and the death penalty (mo, yi, fei, gong, da pi; 墨, 
劓, 剕, 宫, 大辟). 78 The Chinese character of ‘xing’ (刑), which means 
“punishments” in modern-day Chinese, meant corporal punishment and 
capital punishment in ancient Chinese.79  Exile, criminal servitude, and 
fines were enforced forms of punishment, but were not regarded as types 
of ‘xing’. In ancient times, codified punishments were limited to 
irreversible penalties.80 With the exception of tattooing as an imposition of 
shame for offenders, the primary purposes of other forms of punishment 
were deterrence and incapacitation. 
Irreversible punishments violated Confucian doctrine. Thus, 
Emperor Wen of the West Han Dynasty, who ruled China from 180 B.C.E. 
to 157 B.C.E., abolished tattooing, cutting off noses, and severing feet, 
and introduced stick beating as an alternative.81 He justified his reforms 
with Confucian doctrine.82 In his edict, he said that, in ancient times, the 
ruler merely marked a criminal’s clothing. Doing so would bring public 
shame and would, in turn, deter them from committing future crimes.83 
Moreover, Emperor Wen argued that, despite the harsh punishments, crime 
was still a pervasive issue. The emperor believed that the increasing crime 
rate was due to his own failure to encourage moral education. Moral 
education was applied before punishment, but moral education failed. He 
therefore promoted moral values and social reforms, and gave criminals 
the opportunity to reintegrate into society.84  
The more severe corporal punishments were denounced for 
economic reasons, as they often crippled able-bodies agricultural workers. 
However, in the Chinese context, stick-beating was meant to correct errant 
behavior and educate wrongdoers.85 The Chinese character for “beating 
with the smaller stick” has the same pronunciation as “shame.” According 
to Confucianism, if a person was perceived as having no sense of shame, 
then that person might be considered beyond moral reach, and thus was 
even feared by the devil.86 Stick-beating was supposed to shame criminals, 
and the sense of shame would encourage criminals to repent. Furthermore, 
the sense of repentance would prevent criminals from committing further 
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crime.87 This causal relation between stick-beating and moral education 
was embodied in the Chinese penal code. The Tang Code, which was 
promulgated in 653 B.C.E., was the earliest surviving code from which 
one can view an accurate picture of the range of laws in imperial China.88 
Almost every penal code in subsequent dynasties copied the Tang Code, 
albeit with slight changes.89 In the Tang Code, chi (笞) means “to beat,” 
and also means chi (耻) or “to shame.” If a person commits a minor 
offense, then the law must discipline that person. Therefore, a beating is 
used to shame a criminal. The Tang Code quotes a statement of Hanshu汉
书: “Beating is employed in teaching persons to behave morally.” 90 
Emperor Wen’s reforms were remarkable because moral education was 
one of the established objectives of the criminal law system. 
In the Tang Code, penal servitude was also meant to shame 
criminals.91 The rationale for imposing penal servitude on criminals and 
shaming them and their families were also codified. Penal servitude meant 
slavery (nu, 奴), and slavery was considered very shameful.92 The sense of 
shame was supposed to encourage criminals to repent and correct their 
behavior. Furthermore, the criminal’s repentance would prevent the 
shamed criminal from committing future crimes.93 Exile and the death 
penalty were meant to penalize criminals deemed to have no sense of 
shame.94 The Tang Code explained that, a sentence of strangulation or 
decapitation was the most extreme of punishments. Embracing Confucian 
leniency, emperors often could not bear to inflict too many death penalties, 
and thus reduced the penalties from execution to exile.95 
After the Sui Dynasty (581 B.C.E. - 618 B.C.E.), the Five 
Punishments became “beating with a small stick, beating with a large 
stick, penal servitude, life exile, and death penalty” (chi, zhang, tu, liu, si; 
笞, 杖, 徒, 流, 死). Since the Tang Dynasty (618-907), the content of the 
Five Punishments basically remained the same. Comparing the Great Qing 
Code, the last code in imperial China, with the Tang Code, the Five 
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Punishments are almost identical.96 There are five types of recognized 
punishments, prescribed according to a scale of increasing intensity.  
The penal code was the second moral boundary, and it handled the 
serious crimes that could not be resolved by the first moral boundary, i.e., 
the clan code. Yet, the punishable crimes in the clan codes and the penal 
code overlapped. The old texts of the clan codes inferred that the overlaps 
were mainly about theft, fraud, gambling, drug abuse, adultery, and other 
petty offenses within the clans. The punishments at the low end of the 
punishment spectrum in the national code, including stick-beating and 
penal servitude, were also incorporated into the clan codes. Since most 
petty offenses were handled internally amongst the clans, formal 
punishments primarily dealt with very serious crimes and were relatively 
harsh. 
4. Dual Legal System in the Imperial Era 
The clan codes and penal code formed the dual legal system in 
Imperial China.97 The principles of the penal code and the clan codes were 
nearly the same.98  The clan codes were based on the penal code and 
patriarchal custom. Like the penal code, the clan codes were also the 
embodiment of Confucian rites. The punishable offenses in the clan codes 
and penal code overlapped. Because the clan played the primary role of 
social control, the overlaps between the clan codes and penal code should 
only be the minor offenses within the clans. Indeed, the old texts of the 
clan codes show that the overlaps were mainly about minor offenses such 
as theft, fraud, gambling, drug problems, and adultery. The minor 
punishments in the penal code, including stick-beating and penal 
servitude, were also introduced into the clan codes. If a clan found one of 
its members guilty of a serious and indictable offense, a charge against this 
member would also be brought before the magistrate, in addition to the 
imposed clan. 99  Derk Bodde summarized the longstanding custom of 
unofficial jurisdiction as “extra-legal organs and procedures, then, were 
what the Chinese everyman normally looked to for guidance and sanction, 
rather than to the formal judicial system per se. Involvement in the latter 
was popularly regarded as a road to disaster and therefore to be avoided at 
all cost.”100 
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5. Disproportionate Clan Punishments in the Imperial Era 
Despite the virtues of clan self-regulation, the power of the clan 
leaders to punish its members was generally excessive and unchecked by 
the imperial government.101 Emperor Daoguang, who ruled China from 
1821 to 1850, ordered that “any affair within a clan, whether serious or 
trivial, shall be judged by the patriarch.”102 Thus, the imperial government 
did not limit the severity of clan punishments. Punishments received by 
clan members were not proportionate with the severity of the crimes 
committed. 103  Members were punished with stick-beating for either 
cutting a tree branch near an ancestral grave or cursing their parents. 
Likewise, members were punished with penal servitude for misbehaving 
while offering sacrifices to their ancestors. In extreme cases, members 
were executed for adultery, theft, or mining coal near an ancestral grave.104 
Moreover, wrongdoers punished within the clan rarely had an opportunity 
to appeal to official magistrates.105 As such, clan codes imposed a duty on 
its members to avoid quarrels, often forbade members from suing in 
official courts, and forced them to plead their cases to their clan leaders. If 
the clan members violated this stipulation, they were punished. For 
example, according to the clan code of Pi Ling Liu Shi 毗陵刘氏 in 1900, 
those who were involved in lawsuits without the clan leaders’ permission 
were punished with ten slaps to the face.106 Thus in many cases, the clan 
punishments could be harsher and more barbaric than the criminal 
punishments prescribed by the penal code. 
6. Heavy Penaltyism of Formal Punishments During the Imperial Era 
The principle of heavy penaltyism was a Legalist concept. 
However, harsh penalties also fit within Confucian doctrine.107 According 
to Confucius, punishments should pertain to rites, and the severity of 
punishment should be proportionate to the seriousness of the crime: 
“When rites do not flourish, punishments will not be exactly right; when 
punishments do not be exactly right, the populace will be puzzled about 
how to behave acceptably.”108 Although the proportionality principle was a 
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central tenet, Confucius accepted that a deteriorating public order was an 
exception to the proportionality principle. The severity of enforced 
punishments was adjusted according to the state of public order. If there 
was a high crime rate, punishments were relatively harsh.109 
Later Confucians and neo-Confucians rarely discussed the 
proportionality of punishment and emphasized the role of punishment in 
crime prevention more so than Confucius. Their penal philosophy 
reflected “the confucianization of law,” which reflected both a legalist and 
Confucian spirit. Neo-Confucians still stressed the value of moral 
education, but moral education alone was insufficient to prevent crime. In 
comparison, punishments were a more effective tool. Zhu Xi, a well-
known neo-Confucian scholar, even advocated heavy penaltyism to deter 
crime: “laws should be strict, in essence, with lenient rules as 
supplements.”110  
The heavy penaltyism with supplementary moral education 
proposed by the neo-Confucians was tailored to the rulers in imperial 
China. Rulers surrounded themselves with the aura of Confucian 
benevolence, while in actuality embracing legalist principles. 111  Most 
rulers in Imperial China used deteriorating public order as a justification to 
impose more severe punishments than the penal code prescribed. 
Furthermore, the immediate effects of severe punishments on public order 
were usually emphasized. The alleged effectiveness influenced the vast 
majority subliminally. As a result, the overarching heavy penaltyism was 
not only embraced by the authorities, but also supported by a high 
proportion of the population. Therefore, most Chinese scholars insist that 
the penal system was virtually legalism with a Confucian façade.112 
7. Normalization of Illegal Punishments 
In Imperial law, only the Five Punishments were enforceable 
penalties. Imperial China, however, was a society ruled by man, and 
various cruel punishments were openly practiced. Corporal punishments 
were gradually abolished in the periods of the Wei, Jin, Northern, and 
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Southern Dynasties (220-589). Likewise, the death penalty was restricted 
to strangulation and decapitation during the Tang Dynasty. Despite these 
reforms, a variety of cruel punishments, such as stick-beating, tattooing, 
dismemberment (ling chi, 凌迟), exposure of the head (xiao shou, 枭首), 
and desecration of the corpse (lu shi, 戮尸) were unwritten penalties. In 
the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) and Qing Dynasty, dismemberment and 
desecration of the corpse were incorporated into the law to intimidate 
potential criminals and to stabilize the imperial government.113 
Illegal punishments in Imperial China were illustrated by paintings 
in Europe in the nineteenth century. Europeans considered these 
punishments horrible and barbaric.114 There were two collections; one was 
titled “The Punishments of China,” 115  and the other was titled “The 
Criminal Punishments of the Chinese.” 116  During the Enlightenment, 
Confucian principles were introduced in Europe. Enlightenment thinkers 
such as Leibniz, Voltaire, Diefrich, and Feuerbach highly respected 
China’s imperial regime. 117  However, since the nineteenth century, 
European assessment of China’s imperial regime has been negative.118 The 
Enlightenment scholars George Mason and J. Dadley were confused by 
the contradictions between criminal law and its enforcement in Imperial 
China: “This instance of justice, moderation, and wisdom, in the Laws of 
China, receives an unfavorable contrast in the decree, which pronounces 
the wearing of a particular ornament to be capital crime; and in the custom 
of attending to the fallacious information, extorted by the Rack.” 119 
George Cruikshank even concluded that the Chinese were Barbarians. He 
said: “It was essential to put the Chinese down.”120 
 These brutal punishments were mainly inflicted on criminals who 
perpetrated “the Ten Abominations” (shi’ e, 十 恶). 121  The Ten 
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Abominations were the most serious violations of the Confucian rites. 
According to Confucius, these crimes were more serious than homicide.122 
Imperial rules applied legalist principles by imposing harsh punishments 
for the most minor of violations against the Confucian rites. For example, 
gossiping about the royal family was punished very severely. 
The emperor tended to impose more severe penalties on criminals 
who committed the ten abominations than was allowable by law. In 
Imperial China, the emperor’s authority was not constrained. Imperial 
decrees regarding crime and punishment supplemented the penal code, but 
in actuality, played a more prominent role.123 “The emperor’s imperial 
orders could not only overtop the law, but also take the place of some 
stipulations of the law, and could be added up as the new stipulations of 
the law.” 124  Because the emperor also possessed supreme judicial 
authority, imperial decrees were subject to change at the emperor’s 
discretion. 125 Accordingly, the abolished harsh punishments in were 
repeatedly enforced. As a result, the illegal punishments were standard 
practice.126 
B. Dual System in the Late Qing Dynasty (1901-1911) and the Republic 
Era (1912-1949) 
Since the New Deal of the late Qing Dynasty, a period of political 
reform, Chinese authorities have made numerous efforts to incorporate 
Western systems of punishment.127 Modeled after the civil law tradition,128 
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the authorities during the late Qing Dynasty and the Republic Era all made 
their own Six Codes (liu fa, 六法),129 which included the Constitution, the 
Civil Law, the Criminal Law, the Civil Procedure Law, the Criminal 
Procedure Law, and the Administrative Law.130 In the New Qing Criminal 
Law,131 the Provisional Criminal Law,132 and the Criminal Law of the 
Republic of China, 133 criminal penalties were divided into principal 
punishments and supplementary punishments. 134  Principal punishments 
were the death penalty, life imprisonment, fixed-term imprisonment, 
criminal detention (ju yi, 拘役), 135  and fines. Deprivation of political 
rights and confiscation of property were supplementary punishments.136 
The primary reason for legal reform was extraterritoriality. Several 
Western countries promised to cede extraterritorial rights if the Qing 
government modernized its legal system.137 Although the extraterritorial 
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rights of western countries were not completely abolished until 1946, 
incorporation of western legal systems resulted in legal modernization in 
China.138 
Legal reform did not change the coexistence of formal 
punishments and clan punishments. Judicial archives of the Republic of 
China reveal that prosecutors explicitly allowed clan leaders, baozhang 保
长 or jiazhang 甲长 139  to handle minor criminal cases. 140  Moreover, 
prosecutors suggested that litigants first look to their clan leaders, 
baozhang or jiazhang, to settle their disputes.141 If the clan leader could 
resolve the issue, baozhang or jiazhang, the Procuratorate would not 
litigate the matter.142 
1. More Formalized Informal Punishments During the Republic Era 
Although clan punishments were still heavily utilized, the clan 
leaders, baozhang or jiazhang, in the Republic Era held less authority to 
penalize criminal offenses. For example, informal punishments were 
subject to rigid judicial scrutiny.143 Furthermore, clan punishments in the 
Republic Era were more lenient than in the Imperial Era. Severe 
punishments like penal servitude and execution were no longer enforced. 
Clan punishments were largely payment of fines, stick-beating, and 
expulsion from the clan. Additionally, clan codes specified more cases that 
required magistrate adjudication. These cases included different types of 
misdemeanors, such as abuse or abandoning a family member, theft, fraud, 
tax evasion, embezzling clan property, gambling, and drug use. In general, 
clan punishments were weakened by the legal reforms.144 
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2. Continuation and Transition of Heavy Penaltyism of Formal 
Punishments in the Late Qing Dynasty and the Republic Era 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the harsh image of 
formal punishments still held sway. Due to the legal reforms of the late 
Qing Dynasty, some scholars and practitioners endeavored to make the 
Chinese criminal justice system more lenient and humane. 145  Many 
Western concepts of criminal justice were introduced into China, such as 
the principle of proportionality and the principle of penal parsimony.146 As 
discussed above, the New Qing Penal Law and the criminal codes in the 
Republic Era were modeled after the civil law tradition. For example, 
suspended sentences were first introduced in China’s criminal code in the 
New Qing Penal Law. 147  Suspended sentences were meant to help 
rehabilitate criminals.148 
However, the implementation of the new penal system faced a 
number of issues. The majority of practitioners in the late Qing Dynasty 
and the early Republic Era doubted the practicability of Western 
rehabilitative ideas.149  Notably, an officer named Feng Xu argued that 
many in China could not widely accept the Western understanding of 
rehabilitation. Although the primary purposes of punishment were 
retribution and deterrence, the principle of rehabilitation traditionally was 
also embodied in the penal systems. For example, criminals who were the 
sole breadwinners in their families could stay at home and care for their 
parents and grandparents.150 Many people felt that most criminals did not 
deserve rehabilitation.151  In the early Republic Era, authorities tried to 
reintroduce stick-beating into the penal system. In 1913, the Minister of 
Justice, Liang Qichao, who was known as an enlightened reformer during 
the late Qing Dynasty and the early Republic Era, proposed a judicial 
reform program, in which he advocated resuming stick-beating as an 
alternative to short-term imprisonment to prevent overcrowded prisons.152 
The judicial reform program was passed in 1914, and as a result, stick-
beating was an alternative to short-term imprisonment. Later, the Minister 
of Justice published a regulation with stick-beating as an alternative to 
other punishments, which included fixed-term imprisonment less than 
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three months, criminal detention, and penalties under one hundred yuan 
for male criminals between 16 and 60 years old.153 The only exception to 
the regulation was that if the criminal was an official or a retired official. 
The Ministry of Justice promulgated another regulation on exile as an 
alternative to imprisonment.154 This regulation prescribed that criminals 
who were sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment more than five years or 
life imprisonment were subject to exile to one of the more undeveloped 
provinces.155 Despite the fact that both of the regulations were overturned 
in 1916, the stick-beating alternative was still used between 1916 and 
1919. 156  Due to warfare and revolution from 1912 to 1927, local 
governments changed frequently. Many local courts and procuratorates 
were taken over by local magistrates.157 
In 1928, the Nationalist Party (guo min dang, 国民党)158 unified 
China and ended the tangled warfare among the various warlords. Thus, 
the government could apply uniform laws and regulations nationwide. 
Between 1928 and 1937, the Nationalist Party reformed the criminal 
justice system. The Criminal Law of the Republic of China was 
promulgated in 1928, and it referenced the New Qing Penal Law and the 
Provisional Criminal Law and its amendments, as well as the criminal 
codes of many Civil Law countries. It was then revised in 1935 to address 
problems in judicial and penal practice from 1931 to 1935. The number of 
death penalties was reduced, prisoner rehabilitation increased, and the 
requirements for suspended sentences and parole were relaxed. 159 
Practically speaking, war prevented the full implementation of these 
reforms. The Nationalist Party unified China in name, but in fact, civil war 
between the nationalist party and the Community party continued.160 At 
that time, authorities were still deeply exposed to the influence of neo-
Confucianism.161 They were still inclined to instruct and intervene in the 
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courts, and push them to impose harsh penalties in some cases to prevent 
the deterioration of public order. The deep-seated and widely used 
informal punishment system prevented the enforcement of minor, formal 
penalties. Prior to 1935, judges rarely allowed suspended sentences.162 
When the revised criminal law was published in 1935, suspended 
sentences were actually put into practice.163 Between 1935 and 1937, the 
ratio of suspended sentences rose to about 6%,164 which represented the 
highest ratio in the Republic Era. Subsequently, amidst the chaotic war 
with Japan (1937 - 1945) and the civil war between the Nationalist Party 
and the Communist Party (1945-1949), the criminal justice system was 
greatly hindered by warfare.165 During wartime, the government issued 
several ordinances.166 Punishments under these ordinances were harsher 
than those under the Criminal Law, especially for criminals connected to 
war.167 
C. Community Penalties and RTL in the Mao Era 
1. Nature of Crime in Socialist China  
China’s approach to crime and punishment in the Mao Era differed 
significantly from prior traditions.168 The clan punishment system rapidly 
unraveled, and laws made by the Nationalist Party were abolished by the 
socialist revolutions.169 The concept of crime in the People's Republic of 
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China (“PRC”) was founded on Marx’s contradiction and antagonism 
theories.170 The contradiction and antagonism theories are an essential part 
of dialectical materialism (i.e. the official philosophy of socialist 
countries).171  
Under dialectical materialism, contradiction is the unity of 
opposites, and it is universal and absolute. The interdependence of the 
contradictory aspects present in all things, and the struggle between these 
aspects determine the life of all things and push their development 
forward. Everything contains contradiction, and without contradiction, 
nothing would exist. For example, in mathematics, there is + and -; in 
mechanics, there is action and reaction; in physics, there is positive and 
negative electricity; and in chemistry, there is the combination and 
dissociation of atoms.172 Mao believed that the opposition and struggle 
between different ideas occurred constantly within the Communist Party. 
If there were no contradictions in the Party and no ideological struggles to 
resolve them, the Party would come to an end.173  
Antagonism and contradiction are by no means the same. 
Antagonism is one, but not the only, form of contradiction. When the 
contradiction between two opposites develops to a certain extent, it 
assumes the form of antagonism. For example, a bomb is a single entity in 
which opposites coexist within it without exploding. However, when 
ignited, the opposites turn into antagonistic contradictions, and the 
explosion occurs. As Mao explained, if contradictions between correct and 
incorrect thinking within the Party do not manifest themselves in an 
antagonistic form, and if those who have committed mistakes can correct 
them, the incorrect thinking and behaviors will not develop into 
antagonistic contradictions. Therefore, the Party must, on the one hand, 
wage a serious struggle against erroneous thinking and behaviors, and on 
the other hand, give wrongdoers ample opportunity to amend their ways. 
However, if the people who have committed wrongs persist in their 
behavior, non-antagonistic contradictions may develop into antagonistic 
contradictions.174  
In a socialist society, the masses (qun zhong, 群众)175 and their 
enemies are the two opposites in an antagonistic contradiction. Mao 
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asserted that the antagonistic contradiction between the bourgeois and 
proletarian class had almost been resolved through peaceful socialist 
revolution in 1956. The revolution was peaceful because only the 
reactionaries from the overthrown bourgeois class were punished, but the 
skills, talents, and cadres from the overthrown bourgeois class were re-
educated, remolded, and utilized.176 Then, he further elaborated the two 
principal social contradictions in the new era in his “On the Correct 
Handling of Contradictions among the People” in 1957. According to 
Mao, there were two types of contradictions facing China. One was the 
contradictions between the masses and their enemies, and the other was 
the contradictions within individuals. They were contradictions of a 
completely different nature. The contradictions between the masses and 
their enemies were antagonistic. Within the masses, contradictions among 
the proletariat were non-antagonistic. Thus, dictatorial methods should be 
used to resolve the contradictions between the masses and their 
enemies.177  
In a socialist society, Mao regarded criminals as enemies because 
Marx and Engels stated that crime was the struggle of the isolated 
individual against the predominant relations between state and power.178 
The dominant will of the state is reflected in its laws and is opposed to 
one’s own will. One’s own will and the state are considered powers that 
are mortal enemies, between whom eternal peace is impossible. Thus, the 
will of the criminal and the dominant will of the state are two opposites of 
an antagonistic contradiction. Therefore, to protect social order and the 
people’s interest, “dictatorship must be implemented for the larceners, the 
swindlers, the murders, the arsonists, the rogue groups, and others who 
seriously destroy social order.”179  
In Mao’s perspective, criminals represented the antithesis of the 
vast majority. 180 They should not be forgiven, and they deserved harsh 
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punishments. Accordingly, the masses would avoid further harm, and 
maintain a good existence. These socialist principles reinforced the need 
for harsh criminal penalties. The proportionality principle was no longer 
strictly observed, and criminals were mainly punished by reform through 
labor (lao dong gao zao, 劳动改造). 
According to the Regulations on Reform Through Labor, one of 
the tools of the people’s democratic dictatorship was the Reform Through 
Labor agencies. The Reform Through Labor agencies were in charge of 
punishing counterrevolutionaries and other criminals, and reforming them 
into members of the masses through forced labor.181 The forced labor was 
conducted both within and outside prison. In the Mao era, only criminals 
who perpetrated very serious crimes were put into prisons. 182  The 
prisoners were kept under tight guard and were imprisoned individually. 
The majority of criminals were organized and supervised by Disciplining 
Teams (lao dong gai zao guan jiao dui, 劳动改造管教队) to do collective 
labor in production teams (sheng chan dui, 生产队),183 but their freedoms 
were strictly restricted. In socialist orthodoxy, collective labor has a 
double meaning: on the one hand, it is meant to punish criminals, and on 
the other hand, it is meant to reform them. The reform process takes place 
through either collective labor or political and ideological education. Mao 
regarded labor, especially manual labor, as a matter of right and honor. 
This principle was written into China’s Constitution.184 Through collective 
manual labor, the masses could have an ethos of socialist revolution. As 
such, officials would not be influenced by bureaucracy, intellectuals would 
do away with petty, bourgeois individualism, and criminals would be 
accustomed to hard work and socialist ethical concepts.185 
2. Community Penalties in the Mao Era 
Criminals who committed minor offenses were sentenced to either 
suspended sentences or public surveillance (“PS”) (guan zhi,管制), subject 
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to certain conditions.186 In suspended sentence and PS cases, criminals 
could remain in their positions rather than work in the production teams.  
Between 1949 and 1978, there was only one legal stipulation on 
suspended sentences. The Anti-Graft Regulation specified four 
circumstances under which embezzlers were given more lenient sentences, 
mitigated sentences, suspended sentences, or disciplinary sanctions instead 
of criminal penalties. The four circumstances were: (i) the embezzler 
confessed to crimes not yet discovered; (ii) the embezzler confessed and 
expressed sincere repentance; (iii) the embezzler provided information 
about other embezzlers; or (iv) the embezzler was young, repentant, and 
committed a minor offense.187 
Besides the Anti-Graft law, no other laws suspended sentences for 
other crimes. Explanations by the SPC and the MJ suggested that 
suspended sentences were applicable to crimes other than embezzlement, 
but these standards were vague. 188  As such, the conditions were 
circumstantial.189 As a result, suspended sentences were rarely used in the 
Mao era. 
Nevertheless, guided by the mass line (qun zhong lu xian, 群众路
线), PS was introduced as a community penalty. As one of the CCP’s most 
important functions was to forge close ties with the masses, the mass line 
was the CCP’s fundamental political and organizational method to carry 
out this function.190 The mass line requires the members of the CCP to rely 
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on the masses of people in the struggle. For criminals who committed 
misdemeanors and other reclaimable enemies, Mao said that reforming 
criminals was more effective than imprisoning them.191 This penalty was 
innovative because criminals were not only supervised by the police but 
also by their communities. 
 Per government documents from the early 1950s, PS was 
primarily enforced against criminals who committed minor offenses. 
Under the “Decisions on Organizing Criminals Nationwide to Reform 
through Labor,” PS was an alternative to prison sentences up to one year. 
The conditions were that the victims and the masses should consent to the 
alternative, and that the criminal should do collective labor. 192 
Subsequently, the Anti-Graft Regulation stipulated that PS was imposed 
on criminals who committed economic crimes through which the illegal 
gain was relatively small193. Then, the “Provisional Measures of Imposing 
PS on Counterrevolutionaries” prescribed that PS be enforced against 
members of the Nationalist Party and other malefactors who were 
counterrevolutionaries for less than three years. Everyone had the right to 
supervise convicts under PS194.  
Criminals under PS should report to the police regularly, but in 
their daily life, they were supervised by the communities in which they 
resided and worked. 195 The Public Security Committee (PSC, zhi an bao 
wei yuan hui, 治安保卫委员会)196 played a vital role in implementing PS. 
The committee was based on different units such as companies, schools, 
streets, and villages. To lead the masses and assist the local government 
and police, the committee was obligated to monitor and supervise 
counterrevolutionary malefactors. Normally, the PS term was no more 
than three years, but could be prolonged.197  
As a community penalty, PS was meant to punish criminals, who 
committed minor offences, as well as other enemies capable of reform. 
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198 Practically speaking, PS was a powerful political tool, as it was 
primarily imposed on political enemies rather than minor criminals after 
1959. According to the “Provisional Measures of Imposing PS on 
Counterrevolutionaries,” PS was imposed on counterrevolutionaries had 
ever practiced iniquities before the founding of PRC and who showed no 
sign of repentance, but were not engaged in any active counter 
revolution. 199  Punishing individuals for their political beliefs was an 
unreasonable penalty. Later, in 1959, the National Political Working 
Conference encouraged an ambitious imposition of PS against class 
enemies, including “landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, and 
malefactors” (di, fu, fan, huai fen zi, 地富反坏分子).200 In the Mao Era, 
society had two communities. One was the community of the masses, and 
the other was the community of enemies. Every citizen fell under one of 
the two categories. Counterrevolutionaries were required to show loyalty 
to the Communist Party, as well as sincere repentance for their previous 
affiliations, to join the categorical masses.  
3. Administrative Punishments and RTL in the Mao Era 
In addition to the criminal punishment system, administrative 
punishments and RTL were meant to control the non-antagonistic 
contradictions within individual people. Theoretically, criminals, who 
seriously endanger the social order, were considered an extremely small 
subset of the citizenry. 201  “In ordinary circumstances, contradictions 
among the people are not antagonistic. But if they are not handled 
properly, or if we relax our vigilance and lower our guard, antagonism 
may arise.”202 To prevent contradictions that had the tendency to evolve 
into antagonistic ones, administrative punishments and RTL were applied 
to those who were not criminally liable yet remained politically 
untrustworthy.  
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While most deviant behaviors are punishable in China, the vast 
majority are not crimes but rather public order violations.203 Accordingly, 
public order violations are much broader than crimes. Theft, for example, 
is a punishable crime, but most thieves are given administrative 
punishments. 204  Only those who steal a large amount of property, 
repeatedly steal, steal from institutions like banks, or steal cultural relics 
are criminally sanctioned. In the “Regulation on Public Security 
Administration of Punishments,” issued by the Standing Committee of 
NPC on August 22, 1957, the three administrative punishments were 
warning, pecuniary penalty, and administrative detention for as little as 
half a day or up to 15 days. Those who were indolent and had repeatedly 
violated the “Regulation on Public Security Administration of 
Punishments” were punishable by RTL after administrative punishments 
were meted out. The state gathered them to work, and even paid them for 
their work. Thus, these individuals were not unemployed and did not 
burden society. The CCP’s Directive clearly limited the application of RTL 
to those people not convicted of a criminal offense because their offense 
was so minor that it did not warrant a criminal penalty.205 These offenders 
were wrongdoers, but were not regarded as criminals.206 Therefore, unlike 
RTL, wrongdoers in RTL institutions had a certain freedom of action. For 
example, they could return home during national festivals. Individual 
laborers could also receive a seventy percent reduced salary from the 
state.207 Following their release, they were not subsequently discriminated 
against in their communities.208 
D. PS and RTL in the Post-Mao Era 
1. PS in the Post-Mao Era 
Since 1979, the Chinese government has made extensive progress 
in formulating a robust legal system.209 The principles of class struggle 
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and legal nihilism have been rejected. In 1999, the Constitution was 
amended to expressly establish a socialist rule-of-law state. In 1979, PS 
became the most lenient criminal penalty in the Criminal Law. Under the 
Criminal Law, a public security agency, and not members of the 
community, was tasked with supervising criminals sentenced to PS.210 
Although the CCP still mobilized and relied on the masses for 
crime control, the role of the masses decreased.211 Between 1979 and the 
1990s, crime prevention was still based on companies, schools, streets, 
and villages. However, supervisory responsibility fell on the leaders of 
these units rather than the individual members. At that time, nearly every 
business was still state-owned. Thus, local governments had the discretion 
to promote and increase the salary of leaders in local businesses.212 If they 
failed to prevent crime, they would likely not receive bonuses. If they 
failed to achieve the goals of crime prevention, they would likely not 
receive promotions or bonuses. This method was very effective as it was 
easier for the authorities to manage the tractable leaders than all the 
members of the masses. Nevertheless, when China converted to a market 
economy in the 1990s, this policy was impractical. Since then, the 
government has intervened less often in private businesses.213 Thus, as the 
majority of businesses entered the private sector, the government no 
longer controlled promotions and pay raises. As such, the Party found it 
more challenging to motivate the general populace to engage in crime 
control. Likewise, following economic reform, social bonds within 
communities loosened.214  People did not work and reside in the same 
street or village as before, and turnover was much higher than it was 
previously. Therefore, loosely-knit communities could no longer 
effectively self-regulate themselves. Ruan articulated that criminals in the 
Mao Era tended to regard PS as a harsher sanction than short-term 
imprisonment because they were treated like second-class citizens. 215 
However, as the social bonds in the workplace and individual communities 
weakened, the punitive effects of PS became very remote, which further 
illustrated that PS was an unreasonable sanction. The number of PS 
sentences was extremely low. Sentencing statistics in China were released 
in 2002, 216  and shows that the proportion of PS sentences fluctuates 
between 0.65% and 1.85% from 2002 to 2013 (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Proportion of criminals under PS from 2002 to 2013217 
 
2. Strike Hard Criminal Policy  
Following widespread legal and economic reform, the vestiges of 
Mao’s old regime began to fade away, and China experienced rapid 
changes fraught with uncertainty, insecurity and a steadily increasing 
crime rate.218 Consequently, the CCP adopted a “Strike Hard” criminal 
                                                                                                                     
different penal sanctions in 2014 on 5 May 2015. 111 thousands of the convicts are 
sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment more than five years, life imprisonment or the 
death penalty, corresponding to 9.43% of the total criminal sentences; 500 thousands of 
the convicts are sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment less than five years, corresponding 
to 42.50% of the total criminal sentences; 549 thousands of the convicts are sentenced to 
criminal detention, suspended sentence, PS, independent fine or deprivation of criminal 
rights, corresponding to 46.38% of the total criminal sentences. However, the SPC’s 
figures blur the most important data deliberately. The SPC’s statistics do not tell us the 
prime concern of researchers, including the numbers and proportions of death penalties, 
life imprisonments, fixed-term imprisonment less than three years, criminal detention (the 
sentence of fixed-term imprisonment less than three years and criminal detention could 
be suspended), suspended sentence and independent fine or deprivation of political 
rights). PEOPLE’S COURT DAILY, http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/paper/html/2017-
11/13/node_2.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2017). 
217 The data between 2002 and 2012 are from the China Law Yearbook (The 
Editing Committee of the Law Yearbook of China, 2003, p. 1320; 2004, p. 1054; 2005 p. 
1065; 2006, p. 988; 2007, p. 1065; 2008, p. 1106; 2009, p. 1000; 2010, p. 919; 2011, p. 
1051; 2012, p. 1065; 2013, p. 1210) and the data in 2013 are from the SPC’s website 
(SPC, 2014). 
218 Chen Yili (陈屹立), Shou Ru Bu Ping Deng, Cheng Shi Hua Yu Zhong Guo 
De Fan Zui Bian Qian (收入不平等、城市化与中国的犯罪率变迁), 78 CRIM. SCI. 89 
(2010); ZHANG XIAOHU (张小虎), DANG DAI ZHONG GUO SHE HUI JIE GOU YU FAN ZUI 
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policy and executed extensive propaganda campaigns to curb the 
ascending crime rate.219 The Strike Hard criminal policy was the dominant 
feature of the harsh punishment landscape in the post-Mao Era.220 Deng 
Xiaoping stated that the country required several anti-crime campaigns to 
punish criminals more harshly and more efficiently.221 During the Strike 
Hard campaigns, although enforced punishments were within what was 
statutorily allowable, criminal cases were often treated harsher than 
usual.222 Some local authorities even set minimum targets for Strike Hard 
campaigns. For example, some authorities required a certain proportion of 
sentences to be harsher than usual, and that the sentences on certain crimes 
were to be above the average of statutory sentences.223  
The first round of Strike Hard campaigns was launched in 1983, 
and was followed by three additional rounds of nationwide campaigns in 
1996, 2001, and 2010. At first, the campaigns seemed successful. For 
example, in the 1983 anti-crime campaigns, the national crime rate 
decreased by 44.7%.224 However, despite Deng’s repeated calls to abide by 
the rule of law, expedient convictions meant that certain procedural 
protections were discarded.225 In actuality, the Strike Hard criminal policy 
did not decrease crime rates. On the contrary, it only deepened social 
conflicts. 
3. RTL Under the Strike Hard Criminal Policy  
The number of people subjected to RTL increased dramatically 
under the Strike Hard criminal policy.226 RTL was considered an effective 
instrument to achieve the policy’s stated goal to punish crime swiftly and 
                                                                                                                     
(当代中国社会结构与犯罪) 65 (Qunzhong Press. 2009). 
219 Id. 
220  Susan Trevaskes, Political Ideology, the Party, and Politicking: Justice 
System Reform in China, 37 MODERN CHINA 315 (2011). 
221  Why Deng Decided to Initiate “Strike hard” Campaign in 1983?, 
PEOPLE.COM.CN (2012), http://book.people.com.cn/GB/69398/16958926.html. 
222 Id. 
223  Shanhe Jiang, et al., Correlates Of Formal And Informal Social/Crime 
Control In China: An Exploratory Study, 35 J. CRIM. JUST. 261 (2007). 
224 Guan Yu Yan Li Da Ji Xing Shi Fan Zui Huo Dong Di Yi Zhan Yi Di Yi 
Zhang De Qing Kuang Tong Bao [The Report on the Situation of the First Fight of the 
First Round of Anti-crime Campaigns during the Strike Hard Campaigns] (issued by the 
MPS, 1983). 
225 Liang Bin, Severe Strike Campaign in Transitional China, 33, J. CRIM. JUST. 
387 (2005); Yan Li, Yan Da Xing Shi Zheng Ce De Li Xing Shen Du, J. SHANGHAI U. 215 
(2004). 
226 Liang Bing, supra note 225; Yan Li, supra note 225. 
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harshly.227 RTL regulations were issued by the police department. After the 
police investigated, they judged and enforced RTL cases.228 Undisputedly, 
the RTL system was much more efficient and less time consuming than 
criminal procedures.  
The China Law Yearbook published the statistics on the number of 
prisoners in jail and the number of wrongdoers under RTL from 1988 to 
1995. After 1995, the report on the data of RTL ceased. The data on the 
numbers of criminals under PS and suspended sentences and the number 
of criminals under different intervals of sentencing terms were not 
available until 2002 in the China Law Yearbook, but some data between 
1999 and 2001 can be found on the MJ’s research reports.229 There is no 
data on RTL and different punishments during the same period. The ratios 
of wrongdoers under RTL to prisoners in jail were ranged between 10.36% 
and 15.66% from 1998 to 1995. In light of the fact that the term of RTL 
ranges from one to four years, but the sentencing term of imprisonment 
ranges from half a month to life, it is likely that a large proportion of 
wrongdoers who committed minor offenses were punished by RTL rather 
than short-term imprisonment (see Figure 2 and Figure 3). 
                                                
227 Liang Bing, supra note 225; Yan Li, supra note 225 
228 Liang Bing, supra note 225; Yan Li, supra note 225 
229 The Research Group on Community Correction of the Ministry of Justice, 
Gai Ge He Wan Shan Wo Guo She Qu Jiao Zheng Zhi Du Zhi Yan Jiu [Research on 
Reform and Perfect Community Correction in China], 5 JUDICATURE TODAY 4 (2003).  
84 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal Vol. 19:1 
 
 Figure 2: Number of wrongdoers under RTL and the number of criminals in jail from 
1988 to 1995230 
 
Figure 3 Ratio of wrongdoers under RTL to prisoners in jail from 1988 to 1995231 
                                                
230 The Law Yearbooks of China (The Editing Committee of the Law Yearbook 
of China, 1989, p. 768; 1990, p. 781; 1991, p. 798; 1992, p. 815; 1993, p. 831; 1994, p. 
845; 1995, p. 858; 1996, p. 872). 
231 Id. 
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Despite its wide application, RTL did not have a solid legal basis 
as the NPC never promulgated any specific laws concerning RTL. 
Although several regulations that administered RTL were issued by the 
State Council (“SC”) and the MPS, they are not categorized as laws. The 
Supplementary Decision of the State Council for Re-education through 
Labor, issued by the SC, ostensibly tried to refine the system by confining 
the period during which people were subjected to RTL. The time period 
ran from one to three years, with a one-year extension when necessary. 
Prior to this decision, the time period was indefinite. 232  In fact, RTL 
contradicted the Legislative Law and the Constitution. Article 8 of the 
Legislative Law states that mandatory measures and penalties restricting a 
person’s freedom shall only be governed by law. Article 37 of the 
Constitution prohibits unlawful detention or deprivation or restriction of 
citizens’ freedom. 
Because no law authorized RTL, there was an ongoing debate as to 
whether RTL was an administrative punishment or an administrative 
coercive measure.233 The Administrative Punishment Law was issued in 
1996, and the Administrative Coercion Law was promulgated in 2011. 
Nonetheless, RTL was neither on the list of administrative punishments 
nor on the list of administrative coercive measures. Nevertheless, the SC 
tended to label RTL as an administrative punishment. The White Paper on 
China’s Human Rights Situation issued by the SC in 1991 referred to RTL 
as the administrative punishment, and the Notice on Further Strengthening 
the Management of Prison and RTL (Guan yu jin yi bu jia qiang jian yu 
guan li he lao dong jiao yang gong zuo de tong zhi) issued by the SC in 
1995 also asserted that the institutions of RTL were executive agencies of 
administrative punishments. 
RTL used to appear as a sanction in the abolished Regulation on 
Public Security Administration of Punishments, which was issued by the 
Standing Committee of NPC on August 22, 1957. The revised Regulation 
on Public Security Administration of Punishments was promulgated by the 
Standing Committee of the NPC and was issued on September 5, 1986. 
The regulation came into effect on January 1, 1987, and then it was 
replaced by the Law on Public Security Administration of Punishments on 
March 1, 2006. Under both regulations, RTL was not among the listed 
forms of administrative punishments.234 Pursuant to Articles 67, 68, 70, 
                                                
232 Guan Yu Lao Dong Jiao Yang De Bu Chong Gui Ding (关于劳动教养的补
充规定) [Supplementary Provisions for Re-education through Labor] art. 3 (issued by the 
St. Council, Nov. 29, 1979) (China). 
233 Liu Renwen, supra note 6; Williams, supra note 6. 
234 Although the implementation of the Law on Public Security Administration 
of Punishments issued in 2006 meant that the previous Regulation on Public Security 
Administration of Punishments issued in 1986 was automatically repealed, the four-
public security administrative punishments remained the same. They were warning, 
pecuniary penalty, administrative detention (one to fifteen days), and revocation of 
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and 76 of the Law on Public Security Administration of Punishments, 
“when a person commits prostitution, dissemination of pornography, and 
profitable gambling and refuses to make corrections despite repeated 
warnings, s/he may be subject to a mandatory educational measure.” RTL 
was intended as such a mandatory educational measure. 
The implementation of RTL touched upon issues of individual civil 
liberties and rights. RTL was imposed on people whose acts were so minor 
that it did not constitute a criminal offense. RTL, however, was often 
much more severe than some criminal punishments, such as PS, criminal 
detention, and suspended sentences. RTL was up to four years, while 
criminal detention was three months to two years and PS was one to six 
months. Published by the Ministry of Public Security, the RTL 
administrative regulations specifically listed the ten categories of anti-
social behaviors, which covered almost every type of common minor 
offense, that fell within the scope of RTL. As such, RTL violated Article 
79 of the Legislative Law that states that the effect of laws shall be higher 
than that of administrative regulations, local regulations, and rules. 
The broad application of RTL meant that minor, criminal penalties 
were rarely enforced. PS, fines, deprivation of political rights, and 
deportation, in the case of foreigners, were proportionally low. (See Figure 
4). According to data released by the MJ, the SPC and the China Law 
Yearbook, criminal punishments are primarily imprisonment and 
suspended sentences, as the proportion of imprisonment is always above 
65 percent (See Figure 4). Non-custodial sentences, or in other words 
punishments that do not involve criminal imprisonment, still only play a 
supplementary role in China. 
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Figure 4: Proportion of different punishments in sentences nationwide (1999 to 2013)235 
4. Balancing Severe Punishment and Leniency 
In 2006, the CCP adopted a new concept of a harmonious society, 
balancing the severity and leniency of punishment in criminal policy.236 
Accordingly, Strike Hard no longer seemed appropriate. The Resolution 
on the Major Issues Regarding the Building of a Harmonious Socialist 
Society (Guan yu gou jian she hui zhu yi he xie she hui ruo gan zhong da 
wen ti de jue ding), issued by the Central Committee of the CCP October 
11, 2006, articulated imposing severe penalties to deter serious crimes, as 
well as establish positive community corrections. 
Severe punishment under this criminal policy did not simply mean 
giving custodial sentences to criminals who perpetrate serious crimes, but 
denotes that the criminal policy of striking hard against serious crimes will 
continue. China’s security and judicial institutions still crack down on 
                                                
235 The data between 1999 and 2001 are from the MJ’s research (The Research 
Group on Community Correction of the Ministry of Justice, 2003), the data between 2002 
and 2012 are from the Law Yearbooks of China (The Editing Committee of the Law 
Yearbook of China, 2003, p. 1320; 2004, p. 1054; 2005 p. 1065; 2006, p. 988; 2007, p. 
1065; 2008, p. 1106; 2009, p. 1000; 2010, p. 919; 2011, p. 1051; 2012, p. 1065; 2013, p. 
1210) and the data in 2013 are from the SPC’s website (SPC, 2014). 
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crimes that endanger national security, organized crime, and serious 
violent crime, but are more lenient towards less violent crimes, minors, 
and first-time offenders.237 This was mirrored in the fourth round of the 
Strike Hard campaigns, which only targeted serious violent crime, gun and 
gang crime, telecom fraud, human trafficking, robbery, prostitution, 
gambling, and drug crimes, reflected this new policy. 238  Most 
misdemeanors were excluded from the campaigns.239 
5. The Residual Effect of the Heavy Penaltyism Under the Criminal 
Policy of Balancing Severe Punishment and Leniency 
Some academics have compared this policy to the twin-track 
sentencing approach utilized in Western countries, which means reserving 
custody for people who commit serious crimes and punishing less serious 
offenders with non-custodial alternatives. 240  The harmonious society 
policy has some similarities to the Western twin-track approach, but the 
differences are apparent. 
Since the release of the Harmonious Society criminal policy, many 
scholars have advocated strict and certain punishments rather than harsh 
and swift punishments for serious crimes. Likewise, many scholars have 
advocated for relatively lenient punishments rather than normal 
punishments for minor offenses, especially in cases in which criminals 
turn themselves in, confess to their crimes, and assist in the prosecution of 
other criminals. 241  However, their opinions do not persuasive 
policymakers and the general public. The general public is unsympathetic 
to what the leniency in the new criminal policy promises to achieve. 
Figure 3 illustrates that suspended sentences were the only non-custodial 
sentences that proportionally rose after the new criminal policy was 
announced. However, the vast majority of the general public in China still 
embraces heavy penaltyism.242 If one feels that a sentencing is unfair, that 
person usually refers to a similar case in which the sentencing was 
harsher. 243  For example, the public has complained about the high 
proportion of suspended sentences for dereliction of duty crime cases.244 
                                                
237 Siyi Ni, et al., China Rejects “Strike Hard” Anti-Crime Policy for more 
Balanced Approach, XINHUANET (Mar. 14, 2007), 
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244 The authoritative statistics on the suspended sentence rate of duty crime is 
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The SPC frequently recommended that the proportion of suspended 
sentences for duty crimes should be as low as other crimes. The SPC 
rarely argued that the proportion of suspended sentence for all crimes 
should be as high as duty crimes.245 Even for juvenile delinquencies, a 
survey shows that 81.5% of the public question the punitive effect of 
suspended sentences.246 In socialist China, the mass line (qun zhong lu 
xian, 群众路线) is the CCP’s fundamental political and organizational 
method. The mass line means, first of all, having faith in the masses. The 
Party members are trained to appreciate the criticism of the masses. In 
light of the mass line, the CCP urges that judicial decisions should not 
only consider its legal effects, but also its political and social effects.247 
Public opinion is a vital part of the social effects. The judges have to 
pander to the public, but public sentiment believes that criminals deserve 
harsher punishments. 
II. COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 
A. The Primary Target Group: PS and Suspended Sentence 
As discussed above, community corrections in contemporary 
China are public surveillance (“PS”), suspended sentences, parole, and 
temporary service of sentence outside of prison.  
Pursuant to the Announcements on Developing Pilot Locations for 
Community Corrections Programs, which was issued by the Supreme 
People’s Court (“SPC”), the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (“SPP”), the 
Ministry of Public Security (“MPS”) and the Ministry of Justice (“MJ”) in 
2003, the beneficiaries of the pilot programs are convicts who commit 
minor offenses and receive minimal punishment. 
                                                                                                                     
not available. Most articles on the suspended sentence rate of duty crime refer to an 
article of the Procuratorate Daily on August 19, 2007, which shows that 66.48% of 
convicts, who committed a duty crime and whose declared main sentence was fixed-term 
imprisonment less than three years, are put on suspended sentence in 2005. Among them, 
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Wang, 2007). An empirical study randomly selected 210 decisions in 24 provinces 
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王小光), Zhi wu fan zui liang xing qing huan hua de shi zheng fen xi (职务犯罪量刑轻
缓化的实证分析), Criminal Science (2014). 
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PEOPLE’S PUBLIC SECURITY (Feb. 23, 2009). 
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Lenient penalties include fines, deprivation of political rights, PS, 
and suspended sentences. Fine and deprivation of political rights are rarely 
meted out in socialist China. From 2002 to 2013, the proportion of 
independent punishments, which include fines, deprivation of political 
rights, and deportation, fluctuated between 1.76% and 2.77%.248 PS and 
suspended sentences are more lenient forms of punishment. PS effectively 
means placing convicts into communities. Thus, convicts in PS are under 
scrutiny by supervisory agencies, as well as their communities. Suspended 
sentences denote the suspension of criminal detention or imprisonment of 
less than three years.  
Before the pilot programs began, the predominant criminal 
punishment was imprisonment. From 2002 to 2013, imprisonment still 
accounted for 65.25% of sentencing nationwide. Non-custodial sentences 
were primarily suspended sentences, as it comprised 31.31% of 
punishments in 2013. Between 2007 and 2011, more than 72% of the 
convicts under community corrections programs were convicts under 
suspended sentences. PS only accounted for 1.26% of punishments in 
2013, and approximately 3% of community corrections between 2007 and 
2011 (See Figure 5 and Figure 6). 
 
                                                
248 See Figure 4. 
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 Figure 5: Proportion of different punishments in sentences nationwide (1999 to 2013)249 
 
 Figure 6: Proportion of the convicts under different punishments in the total convicts 
under community corrections programs from 2007 to 2011250 
                                                
249 The data between 1999 and 2001 are from the MJ’s research (The Research 
Group on Community Correction of the Ministry of Justice, 2003), the data between 2002 
and 2012 are from the Law Yearbooks of China (The Editing Committee of the Law 
Yearbook of China, 2003, p. 1320; 2004, p. 1054; 2005 p. 1065; 2006, p. 988; 2007, p. 
1065; 2008, p. 1106; 2009, p. 1000; 2010, p. 919; 2011, p. 1051; 2012, p. 1065; 2013, p. 
1210) and the data in 2013 are from the SPC’s website (SPC, 2014). 
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The provisions on PS with those on suspended sentences251 have 
many similarities. 252  Both convicts under PS and convicts under 
suspended sentences must conform with the following obligations: 
observe laws, administrative rules and regulations, and submit to 
supervision; report on his own activities as required by the observing 
organ; observe the regulations for receiving visitors stipulated by the 
observing organ; and report to obtain approval from the observing organ 
for any departure from the city or county he lives in or for any change in 
residence. Under the Amendment VIII of the Criminal Law, both the 
convicts under PS and the convicts under suspended sentence shall be 
subject to community corrections programs, and may also be prohibited 
from engaging in certain activities, entering certain areas or places or 
contacting certain persons during suspended sentence. The terms of PS 
and suspended sentence are also comparable. The term of public 
surveillance shall be not less than three months but not more than two 
years, while the suspended sentence period shall be not less than two 
months but not more than five years. 
Meanwhile, there are three differences with regard to the convict’s 
rights and obligations under the Criminal Law:  
 
1. A convict under PS exercises no right of freedom of speech, press, 
assembly, association, procession or demonstration without the 
approval of the organ; in contrast, the rights of a convict under a 
suspended sentence are not restricted, unless she/he was 
simultaneously sentenced to supplementary deprivation of rights.  
 
2. A convict under PS receives equal pay for their labor; in 
comparison, the Criminal Law does not provide any requirements 
on the payment of convicts under suspended sentence. 
 
3. If a convict under PS commits a new crime or a crime was 
discovered for which she/he is not sentenced, another judgment 
shall be rendered in accordance with the articles on the combined 
punishment for several crimes;253 contrarily, during the suspended 
sentence period, if a convict commits a new crime or an additional 
                                                                                                                     
250 The deprivation of political rights has been excluded from the community 
corrections programs since the Amendment VIII of the PRC Criminal Law began to be 
implemented on May 1, 2011. The Application and Execution of Community Corrections 
Programs (Z. Wu, Cai, & Peng, 2012). The book states that the data is collected from 
MJ’s documents, but it does not mention how the data was collected. 
251 PRC Criminal Law, supra note 3, at arts. 38, 39, 40, 41, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, & 
77 (1997 version). 
252 See Figure 5. 
253 PRC Criminal Law, supra note 3, at arts. 69, 70, & 71 (1997 version). 
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crime is discovered for which she/he is not sentenced, the 
suspension shall be revoked and another judgment shall be 
rendered for the newly committed or discovered crime, 
Furthermore, the punishment to be executed shall be decided on 
the basis of the punishments for both the preexisting crime and the 
new crime.  
 
The Criminal Law does not stipulate how to deal with the violation 
of administrative regulations relating to the supervision on the convicts 
under PS. If a convict under suspended sentence violates the 
administrative regulations and if the circumstances are serious, the 
suspension shall also be revoked and the original punishment shall be 
executed. 
Despite the fact that the Criminal Law does not provide a provision 
on the discriminated payment for the convicts under suspended 
sentence,254 most scholars and practitioners still insist there are no excuses 
to reduce the salaries of the convicts under suspended sentence, and that 
most convicts under a suspended sentence are treated equally.255  
Thus, compared with the convicts under PS, the rights of the 
convicts under suspended sentence are less restricted. However, if the 
convicts under a suspended sentence commit new crime or seriously 
violate administrative regulations, the suspended sentence shall be 
revoked. Judges prefer suspended sentences rather than PS due in order to 
promote individual deterrence. 
1. Parole and Temporary Service of Sentence Outside Prison 
Under the Criminal Law issued in 1997, parole can be handed 
down to a convict who is sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment and who 
has served more than half their original sentence or to life imprisonment 
and has served not less than 10 years of the term. If she/he conscientiously 
observes prison regulations, accepts education, reforms through labor, 
shows true repentance and poses no threat to society. No parole shall be 
granted to convicts who are sentenced to more than 10 years of 
                                                
254 Employed convicts under community penalties should receive equal pay for 
equal work. PS scholarly articles from the Mao Era were redacted for political content. In 
the Mao Era, the emphasis on equal pay for equal work in PS cases was to primarily 
distinguish it from reform through labor. As mentioned above, due to the authoritative 
control in the Mao Era, community self-regulation was as strict as supervision under RTL 
disciplinary teams. However, PS was still regarded as a more lenient punishment because 
convicts under PS could receive the same salary as ordinary workers. Convicts under 
RTL, however, could only receive a much smaller salary than ordinary workers. 
255 Z Zheng, Fu Xing Qi Gong Zuo Ye Neng Tong Gong Tong Chou, Ping Deng 
Xing Dai Rang Shi Zu Shao Nian Zhao Hui Le Zi Xin (服刑期工作也能“同工同酬” 平
等相待让失足少年找回了自信), MODERN GOLDEN PAPER (Sept. 20, 2013, 12:52 AM), 
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imprisonment or life imprisonment for crimes of violence such as 
homicide, explosion, robbery, rape or kidnapping. 256  Similar to the 
revisions on probation, the Amendment VIII of the Criminal Law issued in 
2011 deletes the requirement of ‘posing no threat to society’, and adds two 
new considerations: 1) that “the criminal has no risk of recidivism;” and 2) 
that “the impact of parole on the community where the criminal lives shall 
be considered when a parole decision is made.” The Amendment also 
enumerates a list of the crimes which a suspended sentence shall not be 
applied. These crimes include murder, rape, robbery, abduction, arson, 
explosion, dissemination of hazardous substances or organized violent 
crime. In addition, a convict who is sentenced to life imprisonment, the 
minimum term of imprisonment was amended from 10 years to 13 
years. 257  Several considerations for parole, including “showing 
repentance,” “posing no threat to society” and “considering the impact on 
the community where the criminal lives” are akin to those for suspended 
sentence. 
Temporary service of sentence outside prison in China is similar to 
compassionate release or medical parole in some Western countries. 
Temporary service may be permitted for a convict who is seriously ill, 
pregnant or breast-feeding her own baby, unable to take care of 
him/herself or poses no threat to society. It may also be permitted for a 
convict who is sentenced to life imprisonment when the convict is 
pregnant or breast-feeding her own baby. The supporting documents of 
serious illness shall be prepared by the hospital designated by a people's 
government at the provincial level. If a convict poses a threat to the 
community or him/herself, he may not be released. If the execution of 
imprisonment has not commenced, service of sentence outside prison is 
decided by the court if; the execution of imprisonment has already 
commenced, it is suggested by the prison or the house of detention and 
approved by the administrative authority of prison at the provincial level 
or the public security organ at municipal level.258  
The term of temporary service of sentence outside prison is 
included in the term of imprisonment. In order to shorten the 
imprisonment term, the convicts and their relatives typically try to obtain 
temporary service of sentence outside prison. Some convicts who are not 
eligible for temporary service of sentence outside prison may attempt to 
get the permission by illegal means. Moreover, the final decision on 
temporarily service of sentence can be made by the court, the 
                                                
256 PRC Criminal Law, supra note 3, at art. 81 (1997 version). 
257 Id. Revised by Amendment VIII of the Criminal Law. 
258 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa (中华人民共和国刑事诉
讼法) [PRC Criminal Procedure Law] art. 254 (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., 
July 1, 1979, effective as amended Jan. 1, 2013) (China).  
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administrative authority of prison as well as the public security organ, but 
their standards may have subtle differences. The prison or the house of 
detention may not agree with the imprisonment sentence meted out by the 
court, but can recommend the administrative authority of prison or public 
security organ to approve the temporary service of sentence outside the 
prison. This may result in the executive power meddle in the judicial 
power, and the lack of dimensional homogeneity may bring in more 
chances of corruption. The temporary service of sentence outside prison 
system has been criticized for these reasons. 259  In response to the 
criticisms, the Regulations on Temporary Service of Sentence Outside 
Prison stresses that the examination and approval shall be stricter for the 
criminals who are more likely to pay bribe for temporary service of 
sentence outside prison, including the criminals who commits crimes 
related to corruption, disrupting the order of financial administration, 
financial fraud and organized crime;260 but the Regulations do not explain 
what ‘stricter’ means. 
B. Missions of the Programs: Correction, Supervision, and Assistance 
The Announcements declare that the goals of the pilot community 
corrections programs are to perfect the socialist punishment system, to 
mobilize the general populace in the reformation of criminals, and to 
improve the cost effectiveness of penal corrections.261 
The pilot programs aimed to increase the number of rehabilitated 
convicts, and to deter them from committing future crimes.262 Successful 
implementation of the pilot programs would result in an increase in 
community corrections programs.  
Furthermore, The Announcements on Developing Pilot Locations 
for Community Corrections Programs, and the subsequent Provisional 
Measures on Implementing Community Corrections Programs, issued by 
the MJ in 2004, The Announcements on Expanding Pilot Locations for 
Community Corrections Programs, issued by the SPC, the SPP, the MPS, 
and the MJ in 2005, The Opinions on Implementing Community 
                                                
259 Cai Guoqin & Zhao Zengtian (蔡国芹 & 赵增田), Zan Yu Jian Wai Zhi Xing 
Zhi Du De Xian Shi Kun Jing Yu Chu Lu (暂予监外执行制度的现实困境及其出路), 26 
THE RULE OF LAW FORUM, n.130 (2011); Fan Chongyi & Liu Wenhua (樊崇义 & 刘文
化), Jia Qiang ‘Jian Bao Shi’ Cheng Xu Jian Du, Chong Su Si Fa Gong Xin Yu Quan Wei 
(加强“减假保”程序监督重塑司法公信与权威), People’s Procuratorial SemiMonthly 
(2014).  
260 Zan Yu Jian Wai Zhi Xing Gui Ding (暂予监外执行规定) [Regulation on 
Temporary Service of Sentence Outside Prison] art. 6 (issued by the SPC, SPP, MPS, MJ 
and National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2016) (China). 
261  Announcement on the Development of Pilot Locations for Community 
Corrections, supra note 4, at art. 1. 
262 Id. at art. 2. 
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Corrections Programs Nationwide, issued by the SPC, the SPP, the MPS, 
and the MJ in 2009, The Implementing Measures of Community 
Corrections Programs, issued by the SPC, the SPP, the MPS, and the MJ in 
2012, and The Draft Law on Community Corrections, drafted by the MJ in 
2013, all state the three missions of rectification education. The missions 
are correction, supervision, and assistance.263 The detailed requirements of 
the three missions are summarized below. 
1. Correction 
The goal of correction is to encourage offenders to repent and re-
establish social bonds.264 The community corrections institutions provide 
educational activities related to public morality, legal knowledge, and 
current affairs to improve offenders’ moral character and legal 
understanding.265 Additionally, convicts, who are able to work, participate 
in community service to cultivate a sense of social responsibility and 
discipline by working for the common good. 266  In total, convicts in 
community corrections take part in no less than eight hours of educational 
study as well as no less than eight hours of community service each 
month. 267  Community corrections institutions devise individualized 
corrections plans for each convict under their supervision based on a 
comprehensive evaluation of the offense, display of remorse, personality 
traits, and daily life environment. Corrections plans are adjusted over time 
to achieve optimal results.268 
                                                
263 In the 2003 document, supervision was prioritized over correction. Since 
2009, the order of the three missions has been prioritized as correction, supervision, and 
assistance. Fan Chongyi & Liu Wenhua, supra note 259. 
264  Announcement on the Development of Pilot Locations for Community 
Corrections, supra note 4, at art. 2.2.1; She Qu Jiao Zheng Zan Xing Ban Fa (社区矫正
暂行办法) [Provisional Implementing Measures of Community Corrections] (issued by 
the MJ, 2004) (China); Guan Yu Zai Quan Guo Shi Xing She Qu Jiao Zheng Gong Zuo 
De Yi Jian (关于在全国试行社区矫正工作的意见) [Suggestions on Enforcing the Pilot 
Community Corrections Nationwide] art. 3.1 (issued by the SPC, SPP, MPC ,and MJ, 
2009) (China); She Ju Jiao Zheng Shi Shi Ban Fa (社区矫正实施办法) [Implementing 
Measures of Community Corrections] art. 15 (issued by the SPC, SPP, MPC, and MJ, 
2012) (China). 
265 Provisional Implementing Measures of Community Corrections, supra note 
264, at art. 30; Implementing Measures of Community Corrections, supra note 264, at 
art. 17. 
266  Suggestions on Enforcing the Pilot Community Corrections Nationwide, 
supra note 264, at art. 3.1; Implementing Measures of Community Corrections, supra 
note 264, at art. 16. 
267 Implementing Measures of Community Corrections, supra note 264, at art. 
16. 
268 Provisional Implementing Measures of Community Corrections, supra note 
264, at arts. 23, 29; Suggestions on Enforcing the Pilot Community Corrections 
Nationwide, supra note 264, at art. 3.1. 
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2. Supervision 
Officials from community corrections institutions periodically visit 
convicts at their homes, workplaces, schools, and communities, record 
their observations,269 and evaluate their behavior. If a convict has violated 
a regulation, or even escaped supervision, that convict’s case is promptly 
investigated. For more effective supervision, community correction 
institutions manage individuals differently based on the classification 
system,270 and technologies like electronic monitoring are utilized to track 
and monitor convicts. 
3. Assistance 
The primary goal of the assistance mission is to teach convicts how 
to support themselves following their non-custodial sentences. 271 
Community corrections institutions coordinate with relevant departments 
and NGOs to provide vocational training and employment guidance 
according to the needs of the convicts.272 Corrections institutions also help 
urban convicts apply for subsistence allowances, and help rural convicts 
contract for land. Convicts under community correction supervision are 
not supposed to experience educational, employment, or social welfare 
discrimination.273 
                                                
269 Convicts in community corrections periodically report to a parole officer at 
an appointed time. Additionally, they are required to report changes in residence or 
employment, major, unforeseen family events, or encounters with persons that are 
considered a harmful influence on their rehabilitation. PRC Criminal Law, supra note 3, 
at arts. 81-86.  
270 Criminals in community corrections programs are classified into A, B and C 
groups concerning their danger to society and re-socialization level. Dan Weili (但未丽), 
She Qu Jiao Zheng De Beijing Mo Shi Yu Shanghai Mo Shi Bi Jiao Fen Xi (社区矫正的
“北京模式”与“上海模式”比较分析) [A comparative study on community corrections 
of the “Beijing Model” and “Shanghai Model], 142 J. CHINESE PEOPLE’S PUB. SECURITY 
U. (Social Science Edition) 151 (2011). 
271 Provisional Implementing Measures of Community Corrections, supra note 
264, at art. 33; Suggestions on Enforcing the Pilot Community Corrections Nationwide, 
supra note 264, at art. 3.3; Implementing Measures of Community Corrections, supra 
note 264, at art. 18. 
272 Provisional Implementing Measures of Community Corrections, supra note 
264, at art. 33; Implementing Measures of Community Corrections, supra note 264, at 
art. 17; Suggestions on Enforcing the Pilot Community Corrections Nationwide, supra 
note 264, at art. 3.3; Implementing Measures of Community Corrections, supra note 264, 
at art. 18. 
273 Provisional Implementing Measures of Community Corrections, supra note 
264, at art. 33; Suggestions on Enforcing the Pilot Community Corrections Nationwide, 
supra note 264, at art. 3.1; Implementing Measures of Community Corrections, supra 
note 264, at art. 18. 
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C. The Two Prototype Trial Models: Beijing and Shanghai 
To lay the groundwork for national implementation, pilot programs 
were first established in six relatively developed provinces or 
municipalities.274 Beijing and Shanghai are the most developed cities in 
China and were the first to put community corrections into practice on a 
trial basis. Among the trial models, the achievements of Beijing and 
Shanghai are the most influential. 
1. The Beijing Model 
In Beijing, the community corrections program was administrated 
by the prisoner re-education liaison. The liaison is a member of the 
Municipal Bureau of Justice. Since 2003, a leading committee, comprised 
of members from the Municipal Bureau of Justice, the Municipal People’s 
Court, the Municipal People’s Procuratorate, the Municipal Bureau of 
Public Security, the Municipal Bureau of Civil Affairs, the Municipal 
Bureau of Labor and Social Security, and the Municipal Office of the 
Comprehensive Treatment of Social Security, was established. 275  The 
committee is based in the Municipal Bureau of Justice. Hence, the 
Municipal Bureau of Justice plays a leading role in implementing the 
programs. In addition to the officers of the Bureau of Justice, prison police 
officers and social workers are recruited as members of the professional 
teams to run the community corrections programs. Also, to encourage 
community participation, several “yangguang” (阳光), or community 
corrections service centers were built, and volunteers can work with the 
professional teams. 276  The Beijing Model was also called the “3+N” 
Model. In this model, “3” refers to the professional teams, including the 
officers of the Bureau of Justice, prison police officers, and social 
workers, and “N” refers to volunteers.277 
The program puts an emphasis on strengthening the supervision of 
convicts. The goals of the Beijing Model are that every convict is 
supervised, no convict escapes supervision, no convict commits a 
subsequent crime, and no convict jeopardizes the social order. 278 
                                                
274  Announcement on the Development of Pilot Locations for Community 
Corrections, supra note 4, at art. 3. 
275  Suggestions on Enforcing the Pilot Community Corrections Nationwide, 
supra note 264, at art. 3.1. 
276 Dan Weili, supra note 270. 
277 Jiang et al., supra note 15; The Research Department of the Ministry of 
Justice, Beijing Shi She Qu Jiao Zheng Shi Dian Gong Zuo Diao Cha Bao Gao (北京市
社区矫正试点工作调查报告) [Survey Report On the Pilot Work of Community 
Corrections in Beijing], 1 JUST. OF CHINA 70 (2008). 
278 Jiang et al., supra note 15; The Research Department of the Ministry of 
Justice, supra note 277. 
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Moreover, an auxiliary goal of the program is that the need for social 
workers generates more local employment.279 Social workers are primarily 
recruited from unemployed workers in their 40s to 50s, who have been out 
of work for more than one year. 280  After passing the recruitment 
examination and completing a two-week training course, social workers 
can sign an employment contract with the Bureau of Justice. These 
workers can receive a wage of approximately 1,700 yuan per month.281 
The social workers on the professional team are full-time employees, but 
their duties are more administrative in nature. Every social worker is 
responsible for supervising five criminals and fifteen ex-convicts recently 
released from prison.282 Their work involves taking part in developing a 
corrections plan, filling out documents, regularly visiting the families of 
convicts, and keeping the Bureau of Justice informed about the convicts. 
The frequency of visits and reporting are dependent on the criminal’s 
classification. 
Criminals in community corrections are classified in a three-tiered 
system. Convicts are placed into the A, B, or C group, with A as the 
highest tier, based on their danger to society and re-socialization level. 283 
Their tier corresponds with intensive supervision, normal supervision, and 
minimum supervision. Social workers play a prominent role in 
intensifying the supervision. 
                                                
279 Guan Yu Zhao Pin She Qu Jiao Zheng Xie Guan Yuan Gong Zuo De Yi Jian 
(关于招聘社区矫正协管员工作的意见) [The Suggestions on Recruiting Assistants to 
Community Corrections Officers] (issued by the Beijing Bureau of Justice and Beijing 
Bureau of Labor and Social Security, 2007) (China). 
280 2016 Nian Beijing Shi Huairou Qu Yangguang She Qu Jiao Zheng Fu Wu 
Zhong Xin Zhao Ping She Qu Jiao Zheng Xie Guan Yuan Gong Gao (2016年北京市怀
柔区阳光社区矫正服务中心招聘社区矫正协管员公告) [The Notice on Recruiting 
Assistants to Community Corrections in Yangguang Community Corrections Service 
Centre in Huairou District of Beijing Municipality in 2016], YANGGUANG COMMUNITY 
CORRECTIONS SERVICE CENTRE OF HUAIROU DISTRICT (2016) 
http://www.bjsgwy.org/2016/0712/6109.html.  
281 Zhang Jing, supra note 18, at 8. 
282 Lin Zhongshu (林仲书), Beijing Shi She Qu Jiao Zheng Shi Dian Gong Zuo 
Qing Kuang (北京市社区矫正试点工作情况) [The Pilot Programs of Community 
Corrections in Beijing], 1 J. SHANGHAI U. POL. SCI. & L. 14 (2007). 
283 She Qu Fu Xing Ren Yuan Dong Tai Fen Xi Gong Zuo Zan Xing Gui Ding 
(社区服刑人员动态分析工作暂行规定) [The Provisional Regulations on the Dynamic 
Analysis of the Offenders under Community Corrections] (issued by the Office of 
Community Corrections in Beijing, 2005) (China); She Qu Fu Xing Ren Yuan Zong He 
Zhuang Tai Ping Gu Zhi Biao Ti Xi (社区服刑人员综合状态评估指标体系) [The 
System on the Analysis of the Comprehensive Situations of the Offenders under 
Community Corrections] (issued by the Office of Community Corrections in Beijing, 
2005) (China). 
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To safeguard the security of the Olympic Games, the first 
corrections service center was built in the Chaoyang District, a month 
before the Olympic Games began.284 Similarly, several months before the 
Olympics, electronic monitoring was first employed to supervise criminals 
in community corrections.285 The service center in Chaoyang was built for 
convicts in community corrections, as well as those recently released from 
prison.286 The Bureau of Justice regularly organizes moral education and 
legal education seminars, and arranges for volunteers to periodically offer 
them one-on-one help. The volunteers are mainly pensioners, who are 
retired civil servants, retired professionals and retired teachers, civil 
servants, neighborhood committee and village committee members, 
college students, and families of convicts and the ex-convicts. 287  The 
Bureau also funds the service centers and engages companies to provide 
psychological counseling and vocational training.288 For those who are 
homeless, unemployed, and separated from their relatives, the Bureau of 
Justice also provides accommodations. The corrections service center in 
Chaoyang is considered to have achieved remarkable results because none 
of the people from this service center committed crimes in the two years 
following the Olympic Games.289 
2. The Shanghai Model 
A similar committee was formed in Shanghai as well. However, 
unlike other pilot locations, Shanghai set up an agency called the 
Community Corrections Office to administer the community program.290 
The agency supported a NGO named “xinhang” (新航) that established 
community corrections service centers. Employee training was all 
conducted by xinhang. The government only purchases its community 
corrections services and has control over its operation.291 
                                                
284 Dan Weili, supra note 270. 
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286 Id. 
287 Wang Hongyu (王宏玉), Beijing Shi She Qu Jiao Zheng Diao Cha (北京市
社区矫正调查) [The Survey on Beijing Community Corrections Programs], 128 J. 
CHINESE PEOPLE’S PUB. SECURITY U. (Social Science Edition) 112 (2007). 
288 Id. 
289 Li Song & Huang Jie (李松 & 黄洁), Beijing Yang Guang Jiao Zheng Zhong 
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290 See Community Corrects Service Center, XINHANG (last visited 1/9/2018), 
available at http://www.xhang.com/index.asp.  
291 Dan Weili, supra note 270. 
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The xinhang community corrections service centers undertake the 
correction, assistance, and supervision of criminals.292 They are required 
to provide collective education, psychological counseling, and 
reintegration assistance, and they must conduct the routine monitoring and 
organize community services. The ratio of civil servant employees to 
employees recruited by xinhang is 1:50. The civil servants from the police 
office, the court, the procuratorate, and the Bureau of Justice are obliged to 
guide the social workers employed by xinhang. Twenty-five percent of the 
civil servants working in the service centers leave every year. Every 
residential district has a xinhang workstation with two or three social 
workers. 293  Each social worker employed by xinhang undergoes an 
intensive training program before beginning work. The training is a total 
of 120 hours and is taught by professors specialized in either social work 
or law. The social workers also must engage in a minimum of forty-eight 
hours of training annually.294  
Community volunteer work is also administrated by a NGO: the 
Association of Volunteers for Helping and Educating Ex-convicts and 
Convicts under Community Corrections (she hui bang jiao zhi yuan zhi 
xie hui, 社会帮教志愿者协会).295 This NGO fundraises for volunteer 
work, recruits employees and volunteers (both citizens and legal persons), 
trains the volunteers, and supervises their work. Although the Shanghai 
Bureau of Justice heads the association, the Bureau gives the association a 
free-hand to operate according to its constitution. 
The Bureau of Justice’s comprehensive review of xinhang is based 
on correction schemes, interviews on convictions, financial standing, and 
recordkeeping system, rather than on the basis of crime prevention as in 
the Beijing Model.296 Nonetheless, the rate of the reoccurrence of crime297 
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293 Chen He (陈海), Lun She Qu Jiao Zheng Zhi Shang Hai Mo Shi (论社区矫正
之“上海模式”) [On “Shanghai Model” Community Correction], 174 J. JIANGXI PUB. 
SECURITY C. 78 (2014). 
294 Wang Lina (王李娜), Shanghai She Qu Jiao Zheng De Shi Jian Yu Si Kao (上
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296 Wang Lina, supra note 294. 
297 The statistical computations on recidivism rate were performed by the MJ 
and the local Bureaus of Justice. The official statistics on recidivism rate are always 
extremely low in China. According to the China Law Yearbook, the recidivism rate of 
previous criminals and previous wrongdoers once under RTL is 0.02% in 2008, 0.02% in 
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is the highest among all the trial locations. Thus, the Shanghai Model, 
which focuses on rehabilitation rather than crime prevention, is inevitably 
questioned.298 
D. The Combination of the Features of Formal Punishments and 
Informal Punishments 
Based on the framework of community corrections programs, the 
programs are completely different from informal punishments, but in 
practice, they have some similarities. 
1. Features of Formal Punishments 
The design of community corrections programs seemingly bears 
little resemblance to informal punishments. Community corrections has its 
basis in criminal law and criminal procedure. The community corrections 
programs were introduced into Amendment VIII of the Criminal Law and 
the revised Criminal Procedure Law.299 Although the detailed measures on 
program implementation are stipulated by the announcements and 
opinions issued by the SPC, the SPP, the MPS, and the MJ, rather than the 
Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law, these announcements and 
opinions do not place any additional burden on the convicts beyond the 
scope of the law. Moreover, the correction and assistance measures are in 
the convicts’ best interests, and are fully justified in its goals of social 
mobilization. 
Furthermore, enforcement authority is vested in the Bureaus of 
Justice rather than any unofficial individuals or groups.300 The community 
corrections institutions have a supervisory function and provide facilities 
for correction and assistance measures. While social workers and 
                                                                                                                     
criminals and previous wrongdoers is much lower than the crime rate of the general 
populace. The data of the latest population census show that the population in China is 
1,370,536,875, while the official statistics of the MPS prove that there are 5,969,892 filed 
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population. The Law Yearbook of China 2008-2012 (Beijing: Law Press). 
298 Zhang Wei (张文举), She Qu Jiao Zheng Zhi Du Shang Hai Mo Shi Xian 
Zhuang Fen Xi (社区矫正制度“上海模式” 现状分析) [The Current Situation of 
“Shanghai Model” Community Corrections], 35 J. CHIFENG U. 113 (2014).  
299 PRC Criminal Law, supra note 3, at arts. 38, 40, 76, 77, 85, & 86 (1997 
version); PRC Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 258, at art. 258. 
300 Provisional Implementing Measures of Community Corrections, supra note 
264; Implementing Measures of Community Corrections, supra note 264; Jin Yi Bu Jia 
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and Cooperation in Community Corrections], (issued by the SPC, SPP, MPC and MJ, 
Sept. 21, 2016). 
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volunteers are encouraged to assist community corrections programs, they 
are only engaged in correction and assistance.301 
By virtue of the success of the pilot programs, the central 
government has made remarkable headway in expanding community 
corrections. Before the RTL system was terminated, the development of 
community corrections programs was more effective, and rendered 
informal punishments irrelevant. Although community corrections 
programs deal with more serious criminals than RTL, community 
corrections programs treat wrongdoers more fairly and humanely than 
RTL. To prevent crime and enforce social control, the RTL system 
deprived the liberty of wrongdoers who did not even commit a criminal 
act. However, to reform and rehabilitate criminals, community corrections 
programs allow criminals to serve their sentences in their community and 
provide correction and assistance measures for them. 
2. Features of Informal Punishments 
However, the execution of the pilot programs, to some degree, 
deviates from its designed supervision, correction, and assistance 
measures. Pursuant to the Criminal Law, only enforcement officials should 
supervise criminals in community corrections. In practice, the masses are 
not only mobilized to correct and assist the convicts, but they are also 
mobilized to supervise them. The general populace seems to play a larger 
role in supervision than in correction and assistance.  
Since the widespread reforms following the Mao Era, Chinese 
authorities gradually moved away from involving the masses in law 
enforcement. The Criminal Law, which was promulgated in 1979, 
stipulated that criminals under PS were supervised by the masses. 
Additionally, criminals under suspended sentences are supervised at the 
grassroots level. In 1997, this stipulation was altered. Pursuant to the 
Criminal Law, only the police can examine and supervise criminals.302 
Subsequently, to curb excessive police power, the authority to supervise 
and examine was transferred from “the police” to “enforcement 
authorities” in Amendment VIII of the Criminal Law.303 Amendment VIII 
of the Criminal Law does not define “enforcement authorities.” In 
community corrections programs, the Bureaus of Justice are responsible 
for the supervision and examination of convicts. In the event of 
supervisory violations, the police are obligated to investigate the case.304 
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Regardless, the authorities still mobilize the general public and 
encourage volunteers to participate in the programs.305 However, unlike 
before, the volunteers are predominantly pensioners, civil servants, 
workers in neighborhood and village committees, and college students. 
They are easily managed by the Bureaus of Justice, and can commit 
themselves to work for relatively long periods of time. In the Beijing 
Model, the Bureau of Justice assigns volunteers to specific convicts. The 
Shanghai Model takes a step further in recruiting volunteers. Any citizen 
or legal organization interested in volunteering can submit an application 
to the Association of Volunteers for Helping and Educating the Ex-
convicts and the Convicts under Community Corrections. With association 
approval, the citizen or legal organization is selected as a volunteer. 
Despite that, the volunteers in Shanghai are also mainly pensioners, civil 
servants, workers in neighborhood and village committees, and college 
students. Per association data, 54% of volunteers are neighborhood and 
village committee workers, 9.1% are pensioners, 7.9% are civil servants, 
and 4.4% are college students. 306  However, there is a shortage of 
volunteers, and when the association lacks volunteers, the Bureau of 
Justice guides the association to make pensioners, civil servants, 
neighborhood and village committee workers, and college students do 
volunteer work.307 
Although social workers and volunteers are supposed to only help 
with correcting and assisting convicts, they still take part in the 
supervision of the convicts in both the Beijing Model and the Shanghai 
Model. This makes community corrections programs a combination of 
formal and informal punishments. In the Beijing Model, a large number of 
social workers are uneducated and unemployed, and their professional 
training is insufficient. However, they are largely involved in 
administrative work in the Bureau of Justice. In the Shanghai Model, 
social workers are relatively well-educated and well-trained, but this does 
not necessarily mean that they handle the administrative work of the 
Bureau of Justice. They are qualified to do so, but lack the authority to 
assist with administrative duties. Indeed, mobilizing the masses in 
community corrections programs is an acceptable strategy, but presents an 
issue of which sectors of the populace are mobilized. 
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E. Issues Facing the Implementation of the Programs Nationwide: The 
Correction Measures and Assistance Measures Become Impractical 
After the pilot programs ran for six years, the Chinese government 
decided to implement community corrections nationwide. To date, the 
national program has been in effect for another six years, and some areas 
have experienced new difficulties not seen in the pilot programs. 
First, in some provinces or municipalities, the Bureau of Justice 
and its affiliates do not have enough personnel. Prior to their involvement, 
the affiliates’ missions were guiding legal education, legal consultation, 
mediation participation, dispute resolution on behalf of the township 
government, community security management, cooperation with the 
police station and local court to maintain public order and prevent crime, 
and the implementation of other legal services delegated by the Bureau of 
Justice. Although it seems like a great deal of responsibility, in actuality, 
other departments simply consult the affiliates for their law-related 
work.308 In some small towns and villages, the affiliates only have three 
staff members.309 Additionally, the staff members are sometimes required 
to work in other departments, as well. 310 In undeveloped provinces in 
Western China, many villages are in isolated areas. Liangshan, a 
prefecture containing numerous ethnic communities, has approximately 
one hundred staff members in its affiliates of the Bureau of Justice. 311The 
one hundred staff members must administer and oversee approximately 
six hundred towns and villages. Thus, it is highly impracticable to operate 
community corrections service centers like those in Beijing and 
Shanghai.312 
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Second, a lack of finances is an obstacle in many areas. In the 
“Implementing Measures of Community Corrections,” community 
corrections are a required part of the budget plan. However, the Bureaus of 
Justice in many municipalities receive only the initial budget for 
community corrections, but are subsequently and regularly 
underfunded.313 The financial problem is especially grim in villages in 
Western China. 314  The community corrections service centers in other 
provinces cannot run as effectively as the ones in Beijing and Shanghai, 
largely due to a lack of funding. 
Third, due to the lack of personnel and funding, some community 
corrections measures, especially those aimed at correcting and assisting 
convicts, are difficult to implement. A number of community corrections 
measures, for example, like comprehensive evaluations, individual 
corrections plans, educational studies, vocational training, employment 
guidance, and psychological counseling, lack sufficient funding and staff 
to get off the ground. Several local Bureaus of Justice have to simply cut 
specific measures. For example, community service should overlap with 
vocational training, but without enough resources to devote to vocational 
training, community services are restricted to activities like cleaning that 
require unskilled labor. 315  Moreover, a significant number of citizens 
complain about issuing subsistence allowances and unemployment 
benefits to convicts because law-abiding citizens are currently suffering 
from economic hardships.316 
Lastly, the overwhelming emphasis on crime prevention has 
resulted in stricter supervision of convicts in community corrections. The 
criteria that determine program success are skewed toward crime 
prevention. 317  MJ statistics reveal that the reoccurrence of crime 
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committed by convicts in community corrections remains under 0.2%,318 
and the Bureau of Justice in Shanxi Province even reported that the crime 
reoccurrence rate was just 0.015%.319 Despite the fact that no minimum 
targets were established, most local bureaus set individual goals of 
achieving rates under 1% to avoid lagging behind other municipalities.320 
Although a number of correction and assistance measures are impractical, 
the local Bureaus of Justice must achieve this goal.321 Therefore, while 
convicts in community corrections are those not likely to commit future 
crimes, supervision of these criminals has intensified.322 Due to the lack of 
personnel, enforcement authorities rely heavily on community 
involvement.323 Unfortunately, this development may have a detrimental 
effect on the successful expansion of community corrections programs. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In China, formal and informal punishments traditionally coexist. 
Although Chinese rulers generally justified informal punishments from a 
moral Confucian perspective, they, in fact, appreciated its utilitarian value 
more so than anything else. Specifically, imperial rulers valued the 
immediate deterrence provided by informal punishments. “In any political 
system, the difference between principled reform and reform for narrow 
utilitarian reasons is inevitably muddied, and this is especially the case in 
China's political culture.”324 Nonetheless, the effectiveness and efficiency 
of informal punishments were prioritized, often at the expense of 
individual civil rights and civil liberties. Without a sound, legal basis, 
informal punishments were regularly harsher than criminal penalties at the 
low end of spectrum. Furthermore, wrongdoers penalized informally were 
not subject to the rule of law, and were not granted the individual rights 
and freedoms guaranteed in criminal and procedural laws. As such, 
offenders could not legally challenge the imposed informal punishments. 
Severe informal punishments shifted the entire punishment system 
towards heavy penaltyism. The majority of minor offenses were punished 
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informally, and the general public, therefore, inevitably considered formal 
punishments a harsh remedy. In China, historical, political, and social 
trends led to the development of harsh penaltyism. Although competing 
schools of thought in imperial China had different perspectives on the role 
of formal punishment in crime prevention, these ideologies regarded 
deterrence as the predominant rationale for punishment. Therefore, 
effective deterrence justified the use of severe punishment on criminals, 
which overrode classic, Confucian principles of proportionality. In 
socialist ideology, the punishment system was perceived as an instrument 
of class struggle, in which enemies were targeted and punished.  
When the CCP abolished RTL, scholars at home and abroad 
debated whether this marked the end of informal punishments in China. 
Community corrections programs, however, represent a combination of 
formal and informal punishments. Rhetorically, the legitimate goals of the 
programs no longer focus only on crime prevention, but also heavily 
emphasize the rehabilitation and societal reintegration of criminals. 
However, in practice, the implementation of community corrections 
programs was unavoidably tinged by utilitarian motives. Essentially, while 
rehabilitation was the primary goal, deterrence is the ultimate goal. The 
administration of community corrections programs is not just for the 
welfare of criminals. If community corrections programs facilitate more 
effective crime prevention, then these programs could play a more 
prominent role. The reoccurrence of crime is standard by which success is 
measured. The local Bureau of Justice tries to show the effectiveness of 
the community corrections programs with low crime rates. However, these 
low rates are not achieved by engaging in corrective and assistive 
measures, but more so by focusing on intensified supervision and 
narrowing the list of criminals who can receive community penalties. As 
E. Li exhorts, “in China, community corrections is a penal and policing 
approach that primarily represents an actuarial form of justice.”325 The 
actuarial justice is driven by cost-effectiveness and techniques for 
identifying, classifying, and managing offenders, rather than rehabilitating 
them. This creates financial obstacles to secure proper implementation of 
rehabilitation programs. Moreover, although the Bureau of Justice is 
responsible for supervisory measures, in practice, a large part of criminal 
supervision is handled by social workers. These practices deviate from the 
original program, and shares features of informal punishments. 
The prevention of the reoccurrence of crime is the predominant 
standard of assessment, and therefore, local authorities place a greater 
emphasis on supervisory measures, and heavily rely on age-old patterns of 
public surveillance pattern. Corrective and assistive measures and 
assistance measures are clearly linked with desistance, but they can only 
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demonstrate their effects on crime prevention in the course of time, while 
the supervision measures could be effective immediately. As such, the 
corrective and assistive measures and assistance measures are difficult to 
measure as opposed to supervisory measures. However, the eventual 
criminogenic effect of people holding the criminal justice system in 
contempt may outweigh the immediate deterrent effect.326 The failure of 
Strike Hard campaigns has already proven this. As Confucianism teaches, 
“benevolent rulers always insist on their long-range planning and are 
never anxious to see the instant benefit.”327 
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